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1. Introduction
Since the 1990s, economic research has played an
increasingly important role in the practical organi-
zation and design of markets. The phrase market de-
sign includes “the design not only ofmarketplaces but
also of other economic environments, institutions and
allocation rules” (Roth 2015, p. 290). Prominent ex-
amples of market design include the auctions for
spectrum, electricity, and other commodities; trad-
able permit systems for pollution abatement and
other environmental regulations; online auctions;
online reputation and feedback systems; financial
markets; labor market clearinghouses; formal pro-
cedures for student assignment to public schools or
colleges; centralized systems for the allocation of or-
gans; and other relatedmatching and tradingprocesses.
In many of these cases, theoretical, experimental and
empirical research have complemented each other and
influenced the design of market institutions.
In the process of bringing a theoretical idea or result
to practice, the research strategy is often to observe
the performance of the new market design in the
context of the simple situations that can be created in a
laboratory and assess its performance relative towhat
it was created to do and relative to the theory on
which its creation rests. For this reason, laboratory
experiments are often compared with a wind tunnel.
For the rest of this section, we will briefly review
several important papers published in Management
Science related tomarket design and human behavior.
At the theoretical level, the most important tool for
market design is game theory. In the first 20 years
after von Neuman and Morgenstern published their
seminal book, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,
game theory largely remained an academic pastime,
primarily because of the technical difficulties of mod-
eling games of incomplete information that underly al-
most all economic environments of interests (Morris
2019). Between 1967 and 1968, John Harsanyi pub-
lished three path-breaking papers in Management
Science, where he successfully argued that we can
incorporate any incomplete information without loss
of generality as the interim stage of some suitably
constructed model of asymmetric information and
extended Nash’s concept of an equilibrium point to
games of incomplete information (Harsanyi 1967,
1968a, b). One of the many important results from
these papers was the concept of a type that summarizes
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the relevant characteristics of a particular player.
These three papers provided economists with the
much-needed tools for studying asymmetric infor-
mation problems in strategic interactions (Gul 1997).
The first applied area of economics that embraced
game theory was industrial organization, which gener-
ated many interesting insights on bargaining, contract
design, pricing, and other practical problems that influ-
enced the theory and practice of management. Game
theory has since contributed considerably to virtually
all applied theoretical research in economics andpolitical
science. Harsanyi’s three Management Science papers
are broadly considered the precursor to the game
theory takeover of economic theory (Morris 2019).
Primarily for his contributions in formalizing games
of incomplete information, John Harsanyi, together
with John Nash and Reinhardt Selten, received The
Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Science inMemory
of Alfred Nobel in 1994 (Nobel Foundation 2019a).
In addition to theoretical foundations for market
design, Management Science has also published a se-
quence of influential papers on human behavior. Here
we highlight two such papers by researchers pivotal
in the creation of the now vibrant field of behavioral
economics. The first paper is from Kahneman and
Lovallo (1993), who study choice under uncertainty
by focusing on isolation errors, whereby people tend to
treat risky prospects separately rather than together.
In their first prospect theory paper, Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) raised two central aspects of choice
under uncertainty: the role of loss aversion and the
probability weighting function. Isolation errors as the
third component in risky choice is “something whose
centrality to understanding risk attitudes researchers
have only begun to fully appreciate” (Rabin 2003
page 169). In this paper, Kahneman and Lovallo not
only presented experimental results demonstrating
the prevalence of isolation errors but also applied it
extensively in the context of managerial decision
making to explain, for example, the pervasiveness of
small-scale insurance policies, such as extended
warranties on consumer products and the equity
premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler 1995). “For
having integrated insights frompsychological research
into economic science, especially concerning human
judgment and decision-making under uncertainty,”
Daniel Kahneman shared the 2002 Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomics (Nobel Foundation 2019b).
A second paper highlighted here is by Thaler and
Johnson (1990), who investigate how risk-taking is
affected by prior gains and losses. They present ex-
perimental data supporting the house money effect,
whereby decision makers become more risk seeking
in the presence of a prior gain, and break-even effects,
whereby, in the presence of prior losses, outcomes
that offer a chance to break even are especially
attractive. Summarizing these empirical regularities,
they propose an editing rule to describe how decision
makers frame such problems. For having built “a
bridge between the economic and psychological an-
alyses of individual decision-making” and for his
instrumental role “in creating the new and rapidly
expanding field of behavioral economics,” Richard
Thaler received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2017
(Nobel Foundation 2019c).
Finally, Management Science has published a se-
quence of papers on market design that combines
theoretical insights with laboratory experiments to
shed light on new market designs. Here we highlight
Katok and Roth (2004), who investigate in the labo-
ratory the performance of two auction formats for
selling multiple homogenous objects: the ascending
auctions used in eBay and the descending auctions
best known for its use in the flower auctions in the
Netherlands. The authors design three environments
that include synergies and potentially subject bidders
to the exposure problem and the free-riding problem.
They find that the descending auctions perform well
across environments, whereas the eBay ascending
auction better avoids the free-riding problem. These
findings have significant implications for market design
for procurement and privatization. One year later, in
2005,Management Science published a special issue on
Electronic Markets (Volume 51, Issue 3), which in-
cludes foundational auction design papers by various
economists and computer scientists. Alvin Roth, to-
gether with Lloyd Shapley, received the 2012 Nobel
Prize in Economics “for the theory of stable alloca-
tions and the practice of market design” (Nobel
Foundation 2019d).
As demonstrated in these examples, Management
Science has published foundational work in game
theory, human behavior, and market design. Com-
pared with mechanism design, which focuses on the
use of game theory to understand how to efficiently
design institutions, markets, and contracts respecting
individual incentives,market design dealswith a similar
question but recognizes that theory can only go so far
because many people are not (traditionally) rational or a
necessary assumption of the theory means that critical
things are left out. In the auction literature, the Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism (Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971,
Groves 1973) is the output of the mechanism design
approach, whereas ascending package bidding auc-
tions are the output of the market design approach.
Market design at its best takes the insights from game
theory, behavioral economics, experiments, and field
data to come up with practical institutional designs
that have a real chance of improving existing insti-
tutions. Specifically, market design has a few dis-
tinguishing features compared with mechanism
design. First, the objective of market design is to find
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institutions that work better. Second, market design
emphasizes areas of inquiry where theory is relatively
silent or underdeveloped. Last, market design should
result in new (hopefully applied) mechanisms.
For the rest of the paper, we will survey several
market design challenges and solutions, including
strategic timing in auction and financial markets
(Section 2), reputation and feedback system design in
onlinemarkets (Section 3), matchingmarket design in
education (Section 4), and the design of labor markets
(Section 5). Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Strategic Timing in Markets
Although economic theory simplifies markets and
often does not worry about strategic timing, it is an
important concern in market design. In matching
markets, Roth and his coauthors analyze and develop
mechanisms that address problems arising from incen-
tives to act earlier thanothers (Roth 1990, 1991;Mongell
and Roth 1991; Roth and Xing 1994; Roth and
Peranson 1999; Kagel and Roth 2000; Roth 2008
provides a survey). Competition for people and po-
sitions in various job markets led to earlier and earlier
dates of appointment, to the point that students were
being hired before useful information about their
performance was available and before the students
themselves could develop informed career preferences.
Roth designed and helped implement successful central-
ized matching algorithms to stabilize such markets (Roth
2002; Roth andWilson 2019 provide an account of the
history ofmarket design and of recent developments).
Timing is also an important aspect of strategic
behavior in auction markets. As we show in this
section, a strategy called sniping (bidding as early or
as late as possible to gain an advantage) is prevalent in
many auction market environments, hampering the
efficiency of trade. Sniping has probably been first
observed in candle auctions, which were used start-
ing about 1490 (Cassady 1967). In modern markets,
market design solutions that can help mitigate sniping
are often available. First, we show that sniping is wide-
spread on consumer-to-consumer (C2C) online markets
like eBay yet can be largely mitigated by changing the
rule by which the auctions end. We then sketch how
sniping arises in spectrumauctions and canbe addressed
by activity rules designed to promote better price dis-
covery. Finally,wedescribe the race for speed infinancial
markets,why it arises, andhowit canmake tradersworse
off andcreate inefficienciesandmarket instabilities.Here,
too, innovative market design solutions are available.
2.1. Online Auctions
Many auctions, including online auctions for con-
sumer goods, are often run in continuous time.1 The
simplest rule for ending such auctions is a fixed
end time (a hard close), as used by eBay. A striking
property of bidding on eBay is that a substantial
fraction of bidders submits their bids in the closing
seconds of an auction, which is called sniping, just
before the hard close. Bidding is different on other
platforms such as those formerly run by Amazon,
which operated under otherwise similar rules. Am-
azon auctions were automatically extended if nec-
essary past the scheduled end time until 10 minutes
passed without a bid (a soft close).
Based on a study by Roth and Ockenfels (2002),
Figure 1 shows the empirical cumulative probability
distributions of the timing of the last bid in each
auction for a sample of 480 eBay and Amazon auc-
tions of antiques and computers with a total of 2,279
bidders. The timing of bids on Amazon is defined
with respect to the initially scheduled deadline,which
differs from the actual closing time if a bid comes in later
than 10 minutes before the initial end time (only very
few bids came in after the initially scheduled deadline,
so we drop those observations for simplicity).
Figure 1 shows that there is significantly more late
bidding on eBay than on Amazon. For instance, 40%
of eBay computer auctions and 59% of eBay antiques
auctions in the sample have last bids in the last five
minutes compared with about 3% of both Amazon
computer and Amazon antiques auctions that have last
bids in the lastfiveminutes before the initially scheduled
deadline or later. The pattern repeats in the last minute
and even in the last 10 seconds. This suggests that
changes in the ending rules of auctions can strongly af-
fect bidding behavior. Although the study of Roth and
Ockenfels (2002) was one of the earliest on eBay, and
the data were collected by hand, more recent studies
of eBay referenced later use millions of auctions as
data and mostly confirm the results.
Sniping on eBay is not easily explained by simple
textbook auction analyses. The reason is that there is
no time dimension in sealed-bid auctions, and dy-
namic auctions are typically modeled as clock auc-
tions, where price clocks, instead of the bidding itself,
determine the pace of the bidding. Moreover, eBay
asks the bidders to submit maximum bids (called
proxy bids). Because eBay’s bidding agent will bid up
to themaximumbid onlywhen some other bidder has
bid as high or higher, if the bidder has submitted the
highest proxy bid, hewins at the lowest possible price of
one increment above the next highest bid. Thus,
similar to the second-price sealed-bid auction, at the
end of the auction, a proxy bid wins only if it is the
highest proxy bid, and the final price is the minimum
increment above the second highest submitted proxy
bid, regardless of the timing of the bid. This suggests
that there is no reason to bid late. However, proxy
bidding does not necessarily remove the incentives
for sniping on eBay. Sniping can avoid bidding
wars with incremental bidders, with like-minded
Chen et al.: Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management
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late bidders, and with uninformed bidders who look
to others’ bids to determine the value of an item (see
the series of papers by Roth and Ockenfels 2002 and
Ockenfels and Roth 2006, 2013, that offer game the-
oretic analyses for late and incremental bidding strate-
gies and field evidence for strategic late bidding).
For example, sniping can be the best response to the
late bidding strategies of like-minded bidders. In
2000, Hal Varian explained the underlying idea in a
New York Times column titled “Online Users as Lab-
oratory Rats” as follows: Suppose you are willing to
pay up to $10 for a Pez dispenser, and there is only one
other potential bidder who you believe also has a
willingness to pay about $10. If both of you submit
your value early, you will end up with a second
highest submitted proxy bid of about $10, implying a
price of about $10. Thus, regardless of whether you
win or not, your earningswould be close to zero. Now
consider a strategy that calls for a bidder to bid $10 at
the very last minute and not to bid earlier, unless the
other bidder bids earlier. If the other bidder bids
earlier, the strategy calls for a bidder to respond by
promptly bidding his true value. If both bidders
follow this strategy and mutually delay their bids
until the last minute, both bidders have positive ex-
pected profits, because there is a positive probability
that one of the last-minute bids will not be success-
fully transmitted (Roth and Ockenfels 2002), in which
case the winner only has to pay the (small) minimum
bid. However, if a bidder deviates from this strategy
andbids early, his expectedearnings are (approximately)
zero because of the early price war triggered by the early
bid. Thus, with sniping, expected bidder profits will be
higher and seller revenue lower than when everyone
bids true values early. That is, sniping can be an equi-
librium strategy even with private values and even if
there is a risk that the snipe does not make it to eBay in
time, before the auction closes.
When values are interdependent, there are addi-
tional strategic reasons to bid late in auctions, because
the bids of others can then carry valuable information
about the item’s value that can provoke a bidder to
increase hiswillingness to pay. This creates incentives
to bid late, because by bidding late, less informed
bidders can incorporate into their bids the informa-
tion they have gathered from the earlier bids of others,
and experts can avoid giving information to others
through their own early bids (Bajari and Hortaçsu
2004, Ockenfels and Roth 2006, Hossain 2008).
Finally, last minute bidding can also be a best reply
to incremental bidding. To see why, suppose you
believe that your competitor starts with a bid well
below his maximum willingness to pay and is then
prepared to raise his proxy bidwhenever he is outbid,
as long as the price is below his willingness to pay.
Last-minute bids can be a best response to this kind of
incremental bidding because bidding near the deadline
of the auction would not give the incremental bidder
enough time to respond to being outbid. By bidding at
the last moment, you might win the auction at the in-
cremental bidder’s initial, low bid, even when the
incremental bidder’s willingness to pay exceeds your
willingness to pay. Nonstrategic reasons for incre-
mental bidding include that bidders may not be
aware of eBay’s proxy system and thus behave as if
they bid in an ascending (English) auction, endowment
effect (Roth and Ockenfels 2002, Wolf et al. 2005,
Cotton 2009), auction fever (Heyman et al. 2004), es-
calation of commitment and competitive arousal (Ku
et al. 2005), uncertainty over one’s own private val-
uation (Rasmusen 2006), or an unwillingness to reveal
one’s valuation (Rothkopf et al. 1990). Strategic rea-
sons include shill bidding by confederates of the seller
to push up the price beyond the second-highest
maximum bid (Engelberg and Williams 2009) and
a strategic response to the multiplicity of listings
Figure 1. Cumulative Distributions over Time of eBay Auctions’ Last Bids
Source. Reproduced from Roth and Ockenfels (2002).
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of similar objects (Anwar et al. 2006, Peters and
Severinov 2006).
Amazon auctions are automatically extended if
necessary past the scheduled end time until 10 min-
utes have passed without a bid. Although the risks of
last-minute bidding remain, the strategic advantages
of last-minute bidding are eliminated or severely
attenuated in Amazon-style auctions, because no
matter how late a bid was placed, other bidders will
have time to respond. Thus, on Amazon, an attentive
incremental bidder, for example, can respond whenever
a bid is placed. As a result, the advantage that sniping
confers in an auction with a fixed deadline is eliminated
orgreatly attenuated inanAmazon-style auctionwithan
automatic extension (Ockenfels and Roth 2006, Malaga
et al. 2010). Indeed, Figure 1 suggests that late bidding
arises in large part from the rational response of the
bidders to the strategic environment. Moreover, more
experienced bidders on eBay bid later than less ex-
perienced bidders, whereas experience in Amazon
has the opposite effect (Wilcox 2000, Ariely et al. 2005,
Ockenfels and Roth 2006). In addition, because sig-
nificantly more late bidding is found in antiques
auctions than in computer auctions on eBay, but not
on Amazon, behavior responds to the strategic in-
centives created by the possession of information in a
way that interacts with the rules of the auction.
Laboratory experiments conducted by Ariely et al.
(2005) replicate themajor field findings in a controlled
laboratory private-value setting in which the only
difference between auctions is the ending rule. More-
over, the laboratory Amazon condition turns out to be
more efficient and to yield higher revenues than the
other conditions; the field evidence on efficiency and
revenues from various auction platforms is, however,
somewhat more mixed (Houser and Wooders 2005,
Brown and Morgan 2009, Elfenbein and McManus
2010, Carpenter et al. 2011, Glover and Raviv 2012,
Gray and Reiley 2013, Cao et al. 2019). Backus et al.
(2015) find another harmful impact of sniping based
on eBay field data: being sniped discourages new
bidders from returning to bid again—they are be-
tween 4%and 18% less likely to return to the platform.
The next sections describe two other important
examples for sniping in markets, examples in which
traders are, unlike on eBay, most sophisticated and in
which very different solutions to address sniping
have been devised.
2.2. Spectrum Auctions
Spectrum auctions have been used by governments to
assign and price spectrum for 25 years.2 The devel-
opment and implementation of innovative spectrum
auction formats is among the greatest successes of
market design. Over the years, many design issues have
surfaced. Like on eBay (which was founded in 1995,
around the same time when spectrum auctions started
to become popular), one important challenge is to ad-
dress incentives bidders may have to withhold ex-
pressing true demands until late in the auction and
thereby undermine price discovery.
The workhorse for spectrum auctions since 1994
has been the simultaneous ascending auction, which
is a simple generalization of the English auction to
multiple items in which all items are auctioned si-
multaneously. Thus, unlike Sotheby’s or Christie’s
auctions inwhich the items are auctioned in sequence,
here all the items are auctioned at the same time: Each
item has a price that is associated with it. Over a
sequence of rounds, bidders are asked to raise the bid
on any items that they find attractive, and the auc-
tioneer identifies the provisional winner for each item
at the end of every round. The process continues until
nobody iswilling to bid any higher,which is related to
Amazon’s soft close auction.3 This process was orig-
inally proposed by Preston McAfee, Paul Milgrom,
and Robert Wilson for the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions.
Although these auctions end with a soft close,
bidders maywant to hold back, not pushing up prices
on those objects they value most and concealing their
private information until the end of an auction. One
motivation for this strategy stems from an aggregate
budget constraint. It may be easier to push a competitor
aside late in the auctionwhen the competitor has already
committed its budget in other markets. A second mo-
tivation is a desire to better understand prices before
committing to a specific portfolio of spectrum assets.
Sniping, however, slows the auction down and
prevents price discovery.4 Yet, good price discovery
is essential in realizing the benefits of complex, dy-
namic auctions. One reason is that there is much
uncertainty about what the objects being sold are
worth. The bidders typically can only develop a crude
valuation model. They need the benefit of some col-
lective market insights, which can be revealed in a
dynamic auction process to improve their bidding. If
the price discovery process works well, the bidders
gradually have their sights focused on the most rel-
evant part of the price space. Focusing bidder deci-
sions on what is relevant is probably the biggest
source of benefit from the dynamic process (although
this benefit is often ignored by economists, because
economists typically assume that bidders fully un-
derstand their valuation models, when in practice
bidders almost never have a completely specified
valuation model). For such reasons price discovery
is a public good and thus sniping, free-riding on
others’ efforts to find market prices, is a reasonable
strategy if not prevented by auction design.
The standard solution in spectrum auction design is
an activity rule. The activity rule requires a bidder to
Chen et al.: Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management
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be active (that is to be the current high bidder or to
submit new bids) on a predetermined quantity of
spectrum licenses. If a bidder falls short of the re-
quired activity level, the quantity of licenses it is el-
igible to buy shrinks. Thus, bidders are prevented
from holding back. The activity rule avoids late
bidding and controls the pace of auctions by creating
pressure on bidders to bid actively from the start.
Milgrom and Wilson designed an activity rule that
was applied to the U.S. spectrum auctions (McAfee
and McMillan 1996, Milgrom 2004). Nearly all high-
stake auctions, such as the FCC spectrum auctions,
have an activity rule.
The exact design of the activity rule depends on the
auction environment. More complex auctions require
more complex activity rules. Too strong activity rules
might force bidders to bid for less than their true
demands, and too weak activity rules will inevitably
lead to late bidding. For a single-object spectrum
auction, a reasonable activity rule would require that
no bidder can re-enter after exiting the auction. In an
eBay-like auction, for instance, the activity rulewould
imply that all bidders, right at the start, submit their
maximum willingness to pay as a proxy bid. No
bidder could enter the auction once it started or re-
enter once the bidder exited. (This, of course, would
be incompatible with the flexibility needed on C2C
auction platforms, but it is compatible with spectrum
auctions where there are discrete rounds that follow a
daily schedule.) For a multiunit auction of a single
product, the activity rule would require that one
cannot increase demand as price increases. For many
related products, an aggregate quantity rule is needed,
which requires that bidders are active on a particular
fraction of current eligibility or the eligibility is reduced.5
In more complex auctions, such as combinatorial
clock auctions, state-of-the-art revealed preference
rules can make sure that, as prices increase, bidders
can only shift toward packages that become rela-
tively cheaper (Ausubel et al. 2006, Ausubel and
Baranov 2019).
What happens without an activity rule can be ob-
served in spectrum auctions such as the Italy 4G
auction, which did not have an activity rule. As a
result, bidders held back demand, slowing the auc-
tion and limiting price discovery. Eventually, the
auction lasted 470 rounds. That said, Germany’s re-
cent 5G auction, in 2019, lasted 497 rounds and thus
set a new world record with respect to number of
rounds in a simultaneous ascending auction. Here,
the flaw was not the activity rule but the fact that it
would take many rounds to get a one-increment in-
crease in price, because Germany used the simulta-
neous ascending auction with bidding on individual
lots rather than a clock auction, which has prices
increase by a bid increment in each round for any
product with excess demand (see Cramton and
Ockenfels 2017 for an analysis of the German spec-
trum auction design). Measures to address sniping
cannot be analyzed in isolation but must be closely
connected to other details of the rules, such as pricing
rules and increment rules to be fully effective.
2.3. Financial Markets
Markets for financial securities are another important
example where market design has a profound impact
on the incentives for sniping and speed in markets.
Unlike in spectrum auctions, the problem is not that
bids tend to be held back but rather a never-ending
arms race for ever faster trading. Because trading is
continuous and equally attractive orders are pro-
cessed in the order they arrive, speed is crucial in this
format. This limits the performance of these markets
(Budish et al. 2019). As before, the problem can be
viewed with the lens of market design. This reveals a
solution as presented in Budish et al. (2015), whichwe
describe later.
The root of the problem is a fundamental flaw in
today’s markets: continuous-time trading. Continuous-
time trading means that it is possible to buy or sell se-
curities at any instant, where instant is measured in
billionths of seconds—the speed of today’s computers.
Thus, the solution is for trading to occur in discrete
time. Instead of trading at any instant, trading occurs,
say, once per second. Orders arriving in the same
second are batched together without any priority for
orders that arrive a bit earlier, and all trades occur at
the same price where supply and demand cross. The
key is that the trading interval should be short as
perceived by humans but long for a computer.
What exactly is wrong with continuous trading? Is
trading as fast as possible not just good for price
discovery and healthy competition, as probably sug-
gested by our discussion of the need for activity rules in
spectrum auctions? The answer boils down to a com-
bination of twomarket failures. Thefirstmarket failure is
that in times of algorithmic trading, continuous markets
do not and cannot work as they should in continuous
time. Equivalent securities with prices that move in
lockstep at human time intervals have moments of sig-
nificantdivergenceathigh frequencies. This createswhat
economists call technical arbitrage opportunities:
the kinds of opportunities that are not supposed
to exist if the market is working properly. For ex-
ample, the price of the S&P 500 futures contract in
Chicago (ES) and the S&P 500 EFT in New York (SPY)
should move in perfect lockstep, and to the human
eye, they do (Figure 2, left). However, when we zoom
in to high frequency, there are hundreds of oppor-
tunities a day to make nearly riskless money—buy
low inNewYork and sell high in Chicago or vice versa
(Figure 2, right). This adds up to about $75 million
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a year for high-frequency traders, and this is just one
pair of securities. There are hundreds of other pairs
just like it, and, in our fragmented U.S. equities
markets, trades are even simpler: if a stock jumps
up on NASDAQ, buy it low on New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE).
The second market failure is that these technical
arbitrage opportunities, which are a prize to which-
ever trader snaps them up the fastest, create a never-
ending arms race for speed. This fight for the prize is
why there are investments like the $300 million high-
speed cable betweenNewYork and Chicago andwhy
that cable is already obsolete. This is why there are
armies of physics and computer science PhDs de-
voted to shaving millionths or billionths of seconds
off trading times. This is also why there are exchanges
renting colocation services and high-speed data feeds;
that is their way of getting a piece of the prize. Here is a
simple way to think about it: continuous-time trading
creates a $10 billion prize, and then high-frequency
traders, exchanges, and broker dealers all scramble to
get their piece.
Ultimately the prize comes out of the pockets of
investors. The reason is that the technical arbitrage
opportunities harm liquidity; it is harder to provide
quotes to investors if one is constantly worried that
prices will change and one’s stale quotes will get
picked off before one can revise them. Therefore,
markets are less liquid than they should be. For in-
stitutional investors, this means that trading large
blocks of stock is costlier.
Discrete time directly addresses both market fail-
ures.With discrete time, one cannot makemoney from
exploiting pricing discrepancies that many traders see
at the same time, just by acting a billionth of a second
faster. This stops the arms race for speed. Unhealthy
competition for speed is transformed into productive
price competition. Trades occur at the right price, the
consensus of the market, rather than at stale quotes.
High-frequency traders still will be able to make
money but only if they take actual risk, provide li-
quidity, or are smarter than the rest of themarket (they
know something that the rest of the market does not).
One no longer can make money just from being the
fastest to respond to some commonly observed event.
Discrete time also makes computational sense. Con-
tinuous trading implicitly assumes that computers
and communications are infinitely fast. Computers
and communications are fast but not infinitely so.
Discrete time respects these limits. Tiny speed dis-
crepancies between the direct feeds and public feeds of
exchange data are critical with continuous time. This
issue goes away with discrete time.
Continuous time breeds constant change and height-
ened complexity, making markets vulnerable to insta-
bility. Discrete time simplifies markets and allows both
traders and exchanges to focus on improvements that
make trading smarter and safer.
Which market design works in the financial sector
to address sniping is the topic of many current discus-
sions. Discrete time has seen limited implementation,
andalternativedesign solutionshavebeenproposed.For
example, in 2016, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission approved the Investors Exchange (IEX) to
operateas apublic securities exchange.Aprimarygoalof
the IEX market, which was founded in 2012 to provide
an alternative trading system with delayed messaging
(Aldrich and Friedman 2018), is to reduce potential
advantages of high-frequency trading firms. Another
alternative is randomization of order priority as used
Figure 2. S&P 500 Index in Chicago (ES) and New York (SPY) Minute byMinute (Left) andMillisecond byMillisecond (Right)
Source. Reproduced from Budish et al. (2015).
Note. The securities move in lockstep on human time scale but are uncorrelated on a millisecond time scale.
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byElectronic BrokingServices (EBS), the largest currency
exchange in the world. Asymmetric speed bumps
(delaying sniping orders but not order cancelations)
are now common. Other innovative methods such as
flow trading are also being studied (Kyle and Lee 2017,
Budish et al. 2020).
2.4. Future Directions: Economic and Algorithmic
Design and the Pace of Price Discovery
There are many opportunities and important chal-
lenges in auction and market design (for surveys, see
Klemperer 2004; Milgrom 2004, 2019; Cramton et al.
2006; Greiner et al. 2012; Bichler and Goeree 2017).
Many of those opportunities and challenges follow
from the fact that most digital platforms allow mar-
ket engineers much control over the design, imple-
mentation, and operation of markets regarding pricing,
demand and supply expression, information feedback,
timing of transaction, and many other market features.
Moreover, economic and algorithmic design is increas-
ingly asked to address social concerns that go beyond
economic efficiency, such as privacy and fairness. Ex-
citing work at the interface of economics and computer
science attests to these developments (examples include
Bichler et al. 2010, Milgrom 2017, Kearns and Roth
2019, Parkes and Seuken 2020; see also the next sec-
tions). As a result, market and algorithmic design is
shaping virtually all facets of economic and social
interaction in many areas: online marketplaces, fi-
nancial exchanges, the sharing economy, and plat-
forms of social exchange.
In this section, we show that controlling the pace of
price discovery is one of the pressing topics in this
new era of market design. Interestingly, this was not
anticipated by auction theory but rather inspired by
practical challenges, low market performance, and
failed design attempts. Analyses of spectrum, online,
and financial markets demonstrate that sniping can
often be explained by equilibrium predictions. Much
of the late bidding in C2C online auctions such as
eBay, on the other hand, is often best explained by a
strategic response to naı̈ve, incremental bidding, yet it
can also arise at equilibrium in both private- and
common-value auctions.6 Indeed, the effect of the
fixed deadline is likely as large as it is because it re-
wards late bidding both when other bidders are so-
phisticated and when they are not. Market design
must sometimes consider not only the equilibrium
behavior that we might expect experienced and so-
phisticated players eventually to exhibit but also how
the design affects behavior of inexperienced partici-
pants, aswell as the interaction between sophisticated
and unsophisticated human players and algorithmic
bidding agents.
However, unlike in spectrum and online auctions,
which have experimented with various auction
architectures both in the laboratory and the field,7 there
is not much conclusive and clean causal empirical
evidence yet that reveals the relative performance
of financial market institutions and that can guide
market design for financial securities, despite the fact
that policy makers worldwide are already taking
actions intended to discourage high-frequency trad-
ing. Zhang and Riordan (2011), Brogaard et al. (2014),
MenkveldandZoican (2014), Benos and Sagade (2016),
and Benos et al. (2017), among others, provide evi-
dence for the costs of aggressive sniping. However,
this literature comes fromminor variants of the standard
financial market design and thus offers no direct evi-
dence about the costs and benefits of other platforms,
engineered to eliminate the dilemma, as in Budish
et al. (2015) and Aquilina et al. (2020). Moreover,
although there are three decades of studying financial
markets in the laboratory (for surveys on experi-
mental research in financial markets, see Friedman
and Rust 1993, Friedman 2010, and Noussair and
Tucker 2013), aside from particular episodes such
as the Flash Crash (Aldrich et al. 2016), little is known
about the impact of sniping in times of financial stress
as opposed to normal times (but see Jagannathan 2019
for a step in this direction). However, Aldrich and
López Vargas (2019) recently conducted a laboratory
market design study on high-frequency trading that
suggests that, relative to the continuous double auc-
tion, the frequent batch auction exhibits less predatory
trading behavior, lower investments in low-latency
communication technology, lower transaction costs,
and lower volatility in market spreads and liquidity.
More studies on how financial market design af-
fects sniping, market stability, and market resiliency
are necessary.
Also, many other markets, as they move to real-
time interaction, already see or will likely see similar
problems and thus require new clever market design
solutions. As an example, think about electricity
market design, where we are just starting to observe
similar issues. One of the reasons is the increasing
share of intermittent renewables, which puts enor-
mous stress on the system and increases the risk of
outages, so that both improved investment incen-
tives for reserve generation capacity (Cramton and
Ockenfels 2012, Cramton et al. 2013) and more liquid
real-time trading is needed. However, because the
trend toward algorithmic trading in continuous electricity
marketswill also lead to awasteful race for speed, this is
posing serious threats to the efficiency and reliability of
these markets (Neuhoff et al. 2016). Moreover, com-
pared with financial markets, things tend to be more
complicated in electricity markets because of com-
plementarities in electricity production (Wilson
2002 and Cramton 2017). For instance, the race for
speed in electricity trading hampers efficient pricing of
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transmission, which is often done on a first-come-first-
serve basis in intraday trading. Also, a race for speed
complicates the formulation and consideration of mul-
tidimensional bids, which consider the nonconvex cost
structure of electricity production.
Another interesting example for the relevance of
timing in markets is auction design for continuous
sponsored search in the Internet, where other un-
desired bidding timing phenomenon have been
observed, such as bidding cycles with automated
bidding agents and various attempts to address those
(Edelman and Ostrovsky 2007; Edelman et al. 2007;
Varian 2007, 2009; Athey and Ellison 2011; Levin 2013
provide a survey). Clearly, taming sniping and im-
proving price formation will remain a critical aspect of
market performance in modern market environments.
Technology gives market designers an unprece-
dented ability to design and operate markets to better
achieve objectives. One might expect rapid market-
place innovation as a result. However, progress is
often slowed from the inertia of the status quo. Re-
search is needed that improves our understanding of
why innovation is difficult and how barriers of in-
novationmay be overcome (see Budish et al. 2019 for a
study of these challenges in financial markets). Too
often market inefficiencies stem not from a lack of
knowledge on how to fix the problem but from bar-
riers to adopting the needed innovation.
3. Reputation and Feedback System
Design in Online Markets
The astonishing success of online market platforms
such as eBay, Amazon, Uber, and Airbnb can be at-
tributed to the ease in which one side of the market
can find amatch on the othermarket side, as well as to
the fact that they provide reliable information about
the trustworthiness of the trading partner. All mar-
kets require some minimum amount of trust, yet this
is a particular challenge for online markets and sharing
platforms, where trades are typically with strangers,
geographically dispersed, and executed sequentially. To
incentivize trustworthiness, most online platforms use a
reputation-based feedback system, enabling traders to
publicly post information about past transaction part-
ners. These systemshavebeen, andare being, engineered
based on conceptual insights from game theory and
behavioral sciences and with the help of laboratory
and field studies (surveys include Dellarocas 2003, Bar-
Isaac and Tadelis 2008, Greiner and Ockenfels 2009,
Bolton and Ockenfels 2012, Ockenfels and Resnick
2012, Tadelis 2016, Gutt et al. 2019).
3.1. A Case Study in Engineering Trust
One major challenge of all feedback-based reputation
systems is to get people to cooperatewith the platform
and leave feedback about their transaction partner.
Feedback information is largely a public good, helping
other traders to manage the risks involved in trusting an
unknown transaction partner, so economistswould tend
to predict low participation rates. However, in the field
data by Bolton et al. (2013), about 70% of the eBay
traders, sellers, and buyers alike leave feedback (a
number consistent with other research). It turns out
that the key driver of provision of feedback, as well as
the source of various distortions in feedback infor-
mation identified in the literature, is reciprocity. More
specifically, much of the feedback patterns we see can
be organized by connecting them to two of the most
fundamental research findings on the patterns of hu-
man cooperation in the last decades: altruistic pun-
ishmentpromotes cooperation, andcounter-punishment
hampers cooperation (Ostrom et al. 1992; Fehr and
Gächter 2000a, 2002; Nikiforakis 2008; Mussweiler
and Ockenfels 2013; Balafoutas et al. 2014). A natu-
ral way to (altruistically) punish a trader on an In-
ternet platform who is not behaving according to
what is perceived to be the social or trading norm is
to leave negative feedback. This way, a propensity to
altruistically punish norm-violators creates an in-
centive to be trustworthy.However, punishments can
often be counter-punished, which is known to reduce
the effectiveness of punishment to promote cooper-
ation. Indeed, by retaliating a negative feedback
with a negative one, counter-punishment may spoil
the reputation of the altruistic punisher, which in turn
may deter altruistic punishment in the first place. As a
result, the potential of counter-punishment can hamper
the effectiveness of reputation mechanisms and thus the
performance of markets.
To illustrate the close analogy between (counter-)
punishment in the behavioral science literature and
giving feedback in the Internet, look at Figure 3,
which is taken from Bolton et al. (2013). It shows the
timing of feedback given on eBay by the buyer and the
seller in hundreds of thousands of transactions. Most
transactions either end with mutually positive (green
dots) or with mutually negative feedback (red dots).
Transactions with mutually positive feedback are all
over theplace (althoughacloser lookat thedata inBolton
et al. reveals that there is lots of reciprocity:many traders
give kind feedback in reciprocal response to kind
feedback). Transactions with mutual negative feedback,
on the other hand, are highly clustered just below the
diagonal. This means that many sellers, who are pun-
ished with a negative feedback from their buyers, re-
spond immediately by counter-punishing with negative
feedback. Clearly, feedback giving is not independent.
The tightness and sequence in timing rather strongly
suggest that sellers reciprocate positive feedback and
retaliate negative feedback. Seller retaliation also ex-
plains why more than 70% of cases in which the buyer
gives problematic feedback and the seller gives positive
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feedback (blue dots in Figure 3) involve the buyer
giving second: the buyer going first would involve a
high risk of retaliation. Observations in which only the
seller gives problematic feedback (yellowdots) are rare
and have their mass below the 45° line.
There are benefits and costs of reciprocity in feedback
giving. A benefit of reciprocal positive feedback, for both
the individual traders involved and the larger system, is
that it helps getting mutually beneficial trades recorded.
However, in the form of seller retaliation, reciprocal
feedback imposes costs both on the buyers retaliated
against and potentially on the larger system (because
traders might not be willing to leave negative feedback
out of fear that it will be retaliated). This would bias
feedback information to be overly positive and therefore
less informative in identifying problem sellers. Indeed,
on eBay, almost all feedback is positive. Using internal
eBay data, Nosko and Tadelis (2015) find that traders’
positive feedback percentage is 99.3%, with a median
of 100%. The concern is also supported by Dellarocas
andWood (2008), who examine the information hidden
in the caseswhere feedback is not given. They estimate,
under some auxiliary assumptions, that buyers are at
least mildly dissatisfied in about 21% of all eBay
transactions, which is far higher than the levels sug-
gested by the reported feedback. They argue that many
buyers do not submit feedback at all because of the
potential risk of retaliation. Controlled laboratory evi-
dence in Bolton et al. (2013) supports the notion that
counter-punishment in feedback giving reduces the ef-
fectiveness of reputation building and market performance.
However, online reputation systems can be designed
to address flaws in the system. Bolton et al. (2013)
demonstrate that reciprocity can be guided by chang-
ing the way feedback information flows through the
market system, leading to more accurate reputation in-
formation, more trust, and more efficient trade. Specif-
ically, their data show that, compared with the simple
two-sided feedback system traditionally implemented
by eBay,where buyers leave feedback on sellers and vice
versa, both blind and one-sided feedback significantly
reduce the scope for retaliation,which in turn increase
the informativeness of the feedback presented to
buyers. The result is in line with game theory, be-
havioral science, laboratory and field research on
social behavior and reputation building (such as the
Figure 3. Reciprocity in Feedback Giving
Source. Reproduced from Bolton et al. (2013).
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line of research by Bolton et al. 2004, 2005; Bolton and
Ockenfels 2009, 2014), and with field data collected
across various market platforms. Indeed, the idea of
making altruistic punishment easy but counter-punishment
difficult explains important features of today’s running
reputational feedback systems. For instance, eBay
supplemented their old two-sided feedback system
with a one-sided system (called detailed seller rating).
Based on research by Bolton et al. (2013), the one-
sidedness was designed so that feedback cannot be
retaliated by sellers. Airbnb, also inspired by the line
of behavioral research described previously and their
own experimental findings, created a blind feedback
system, where transaction partners cannot see the
others’ feedback until they left their own. This also
makes it impossible to retaliate negative feedback
(although a recent study finds the effect to be small on
Airbnb; Fradkin et al. 2019). Uber, on the other hand,
makes it hard for passengers to identify a specific
feedback giver, which is another way of making it
difficult to retaliate negative feedback. Finally, eBay
changed its systems again in 2008 so that sellers can
only leave positive feedback, which was meant to
eliminate the scope for counter-punishment.
3.2. Future Directions: Incentivizing, Filtering, and
De-Biasing Human Judgment
There are important gaps in our knowledge, and
more experimenting is needed to further improve
trustworthiness and cooperation in online markets.
For instance, because eBay’s 2008 feedback system
removes counter-punishment by sellers, buyers wel-
comed the new design (Klein et al. 2016). However,
there are several indications that many sellers are
unhappy with the new system. The reason is that by
removing the option to counter-punish, the new system
also removes the option to punish buyers and thus
mitigates buyers’ incentives to cooperate. To the extent
that there is scope for moral hazard on the buyer side,
this creates an imbalance of punishment (and thus
bargaining) power between buyers and sellers. Thus,
the overall effect of removing the sellers’ punishment
option on cooperation and market performance is
probably more ambiguous than the study by Klein
et al. (2016) suggests. From a broader perspective, the
question how the rules affecting the scope for pun-
ishment and counter-punishment in interactions with
two-sided moral hazard should be shaped largely re-
mains an open one.
More recent attempts to incentivize, filter, and de-
bias human judgment involvefinancial compensation
for feedback information (see Li 2010, Li and Xiao
2014, and Li et al. 2016 for case studies on Alibaba,
Cabral and Li 2015 for field experiments on eBay, and
Burtch et al. 2018), plans to rely more on big behav-
ioral data and artificial intelligence to better predict
future behavior (Masterov et al. 2015, Luca and Zervas
2016, Milgrom and Tadelis 2018), and blockchain
technology to better verify and audit transaction at-
tributes (Catalini and Gans 2019).
Another pressing question in reputation design is
whether and how traders can modify already sub-
mitted feedback information.One example iswhether
traders should be allowed to remove an initially given
negative feedback if the dispute could later be re-
solved. Many platforms, including eBay.com, etsy.com,
discogs.com, ricardo.ch, tradingpost.com.au, trade-
me.co.nz, mercadolibre.com, and listia.com, have or
had a system that withdraws negative feedback from
both traders’ reputation profiles, if and only if both
traders agree. Among other things, this option is
thought to incentivize conflict resolution. However,
Bolton et al. (2018) have shown both theoretically and
empirically that this system is flawed in that it creates
incentives to distrust, escalating conflict instead of
resolving it. The reason is that the system allows
traders to use counter-punishment to protect un-
trustworthy behavior: If I counter-punish a negative
feedback that I received, my opponent will more
likely agree to remove that negative feedback (be-
cause otherwise his reputation will also be spoiled).
However, there is a lack of research that can guide the
design of rules to integrate effective dispute resolu-
tion and informative reputation building systems
(but see Ockenfels and Resnick 2012 and Bolton
et al. 2020b).
There is also a lack of knowledge regarding feed-
back giving, content, and use in credence good markets,
such asmarkets formedical, financial, or technical repair
services. One major difference to the kind of online
markets we have discussed this far is that consumers are
often persistently unable to identify the quality of service
that fits their needs best. This poses new challenges to
designing effective and behaviorally robustmechanisms
that promote trust and trustworthiness in these markets
(Dulleck et al. 2011; Balafoutas et al. 2013, 2017;
Kerschbamer et al. 2016, 2019).
We finally emphasize that research on engineering
trust in online markets has been inspired by practical
design problems. Indeed, standard reputation theory
hardly anticipated the kinds of problems that online
markets facewhen implementing reputation systems.
Theory often assumes that reputation information is
perfectly accurate and complete. Under these condi-
tions, we can expect to see perfect reputation building
and perfect trust among market actors (Wilson 1985,
Bolton et al. 2011), and there is no scope for engi-
neering literature that guides attempts to effectively
promote the provision of informative feedback in
practice. On the other hand, behavioral research and
experimental studies turned out to be useful in or-
ganizing the relevant patterns observed in the field.
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A desirable next step is to learn from such observations
and develop new analytical models of the relevant
institutional details and behavioral complexities in the
field. For instance, although there has been much
progress in modeling social behavior in the last two
decades, including models of fairness and reciprocity
(see Cooper and Kagel 2016 for an overview), as well
as theoretical mechanism design implications of so-
cial preferences (Bierbrauer et al. 2017), no social
preferences model captures the relevant punishment
and counter-punishment patterns within an equilib-
rium framework (Engel 2014 and Dhami 2016 survey
the literature). There is also comparatively little research
on the psychological and social determinants of the
production of reputation information, connecting the
fundamental behavioral science literature on punish-
ment and the practical market design literature on
feedback giving. Interesting variables include the role of
comparison processes for feedback giving and pun-
ishment (Chen et al. 2010, 2019; Mussweiler and
Ockenfels 2013), social identity and discrimination
(Chen and Li 2009, Cui et al. 2019, Kim et al. 2019,
Bolton et al. 2020), and uncertainty (Ambrus and
Greiner 2012, Bolton et al. 2019).
4. Matching Markets in Education
Although auction markets use prices to coordinate
demand and supply,most of the centralizedmatching
markets take agents’ reported preferences as inputs
and feed them into various matching algorithms to
determine who gets what. Matching theory has been
applied to many important design and management
problems in both the private and public sectors, such
as school choice, college admissions, course alloca-
tion, and entry-level labor markets. The practical
design application of matching theory starts with the
redesign of the National Residence Matching Pro-
gram (Roth and Peranson 1997) and has since evolved
into a research program that addresses practical market
design problemsusinggame theory, laboratory andfield
experiments, and computation methods (Roth 2002).
In what follows, we provide three examples of
how a combination of economic theory and laboratory
experiments informs the implementation of better edu-
cation policies and management practices.
4.1. Redesign School Choice Mechanisms
School choice has been a widely debated education
policy across the world, affecting the education ex-
periences and labor market outcomes for millions of
students each year.8 The past two decades have
witnessed major innovations in this domain. For ex-
ample, shortly after the paper byAbdulkadiroğlu and
Sönmez (2003) was published, New York City high
schools replaced their allocation mechanism with a
capped version of the student-proposing deferred
acceptance (DA)mechanism (Gale and Shapley 1962),
a less manipulable and more stable mechanism ad-
vocated by matching theorists involved in the design
process (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2005a). In 2005, the
Boston Public School Committee voted to replace its
Boston immediate acceptance school choice mechanism
(IA) with DA (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2005b) after IA
was shown to be vulnerable to strategic manipulation
both theoretically (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 2003,
Ergin and Sönmez 2006) and experimentally (Chen
and Sönmez 2006). In this case, experimental data
helped make the case for DA in Boston’s decision to
switch from IA in 2005 (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2005b).
Within school choice research, matching mecha-
nisms that have received significant scholarly atten-
tion include the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance
mechanism (Gale and Shapley 1962), the Boston Im-
mediate Acceptance mechanism (Abdulkadiroğlu and
Sönmez 2003), the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mech-
anism (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 2003), and var-
iants of the serial dictatorship mechanism (Pathak
and Sönmez 2013). Indeed, the question of which
mechanism best meets the goals of a school choice plan
has been at the center of intensive research and ongoing
policy discussions (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 2003,
Ergin and Sönmez 2006, Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011).
We first briefly introduce the school choice mech-
anisms, summarize their theoretical properties, and
describe performance in the laboratory and field
when applicable. We then discuss the major school
choice reforms around the world concerning the aban-
donment or adoption of some of these mechanisms.
Our first mechanism, IA, is the most common
school choice mechanism observed in practice in
China, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Its
outcome can be calculated via an algorithm that puts a
lot of emphasis on a student’s reported top choice. In
the first step of the algorithm, each school only
considers students who have listed it as their top
choice and sorts them in priority order. Each school
admits those with the highest priority and rejects the
rest. Those rejected enter the second step of the al-
gorithm, and so on. The algorithm terminates when
there are no students left to assign or no school seats
remain. Importantly, the assignments in each step
are final.
We will use a simple example to illustrate the in-
centive problems created by this algorithm. Consider
a fictional student, Anna, who applies to elementary
schools under the IA algorithm. There are three public
elementary schools in her school district, Angell, Burns
Park, and King. Anna lives in the Burns Park district,
which gives her high priority at Burns Park and low
priority elsewhere. Her top choice is Angell. Her second
choice is BurnsPark, andher third choice isKing. IfAnna
ranks her preferences truthfully but does not get into
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Angell (likely because she has lower priority there), her
application will be sent to Burns Park. However, if all
Burns Park seats are filled in the first round, Anna loses
her priority advantage and is assigned to her last choice,
King. In this case,we sayAnnahas justified envy as she is
not assigned to Burns Park but she prefers Burns Park
to her assignment, and she has a higher priority than
some student who is assigned to Burns Park.
If she plays it safe and lists Burns Park as her top
choice, she is guaranteed a seat at Burns Park, a better
outcome than being assigned to King. Based on this
feature, an important critique of IA is that it gives
students strong incentives for gaming through mis-
reported preferences. That is, a student who has high
priority for a school under IA may lose her priority
advantage for that school if she does not list it as her
first choice. Consequently, IA forces students to make
hard and potentially costly choices, which leads to a
high-stakes game among participants with different
levels of strategic sophistication. This has been ob-
served in the laboratory among financially motivated
subjects (Chen and Sönmez 2006) and in the field,
using naturally occurring data from Boston (Pathak
and Sönmez 2008). Recognition of these deficiencies
of IA has lead Boston and many other cities in the
United States to abandon IA and replace it with DA.
Outside of the United States, variants of IA have
been used as a school choice mechanism in China,
France, and the United Kingdom. In China, to equalize
access to school resources across students of different
socioeconomic backgrounds, the Chinese government
abandoned the previous merit-based middle school
admissions mechanism in 1998 and replaced it with an
open enrollment school choice mechanism where par-
ents rank schools and schools select students using IA
(Lai et al. 2009). Since then, students applying for
middle schools are prioritized based on their resi-
dence, whereas those applying for high schools are
prioritized based on their municipal-wide examina-
tion scores. Using public middle school admissions
data from Beijing Eastern City District, He (2014)
investigates parents’ behavior and finds that par-
ents are overcautious in that they play safe strategies
too often. Combining survey data, middle school
choice data, and high school entrance examination
test scores from Beijing, Lai et al. (2009) find that
children of parents who made mistakes in middle
school selection were admitted to lower-quality schools
and achieved lower test scores on the high school en-
trance examination three years later. Despite these prob-
lems, IA continues to be used as the major school choice
mechanism in China.
Our second mechanism is the student-proposing de-
ferred acceptancemechanism (Gale and Shapley 1962),
which has played a central role in the school choice
reforms in Boston and New York City (Abdulkadiroğlu
et al. 2005a, b), as well as in Finland, Ghana, Paris
(Fack et al. 2019), Romania, Singapore, and Turkey.
The outcome of this mechanism can be calculated via
the DA algorithm. In the first step of the algorithm,
each school also only considers students who have
listed it as their top choice and sorts them in priority
order. Each school put those with the highest priority
tentatively on hold and rejects the rest. Those rejected
apply to their second-choice school, which re-sorts
those on hold from the previous round and the
newcomers based on their priority, put those with the
highest priority on hold and reject the rest, and so on.
The algorithm terminates when each student is ten-
tatively retained at some school. In DA, assignments
made at each step are temporary until the last step.
This feature contributes to the desirable properties of
DA in terms of incentives and stability.
Consider our fictional student Anna’s brother, Marco,
who applies to elementary schools under the DA algo-
rithm. He lists his choices in the true order of his pref-
erences,which are the sameas his sister’s: Angell, Burns
Park, and King. If Marco does not get into Angell
either, his application will be sent to Burns Park. The
algorithm then re-sorts everyone retained from the
first round together with the newcomers based on
their priorities. Because Marco does not lose his
priority advantage, he is assigned to Burns Park.
Therefore, truth telling does not hurt Marco and may
sometime make him strictly better off.
To summarize, one advantage of DA is that it is
strategy-proof (Dubins and Freedman 1981, Roth
1982). That is, when students can list as many choices
as they want, DA allows them to safely rank schools in
true order of preferences. They will not lose a place just
because someone else applies earlier in the algorithm. A
second advantage of DA is that it produces the stable
matching that is most favorable to each student. In other
words,when the algorithmfinishes, therewill not be any
student and any school that are not matched with each
other but that would both prefer to be. Although its
outcome is not necessarily Pareto efficient, it is con-
strained efficient among the stable mechanisms.
In many laboratory experiments testing DA, re-
searchers find that it remains the mechanism that
achieves the highest proportion of stable allocations.
Depending on the size of the match, the propor-
tion of students revealing their preferences truthfully
varies between 47% to more than 80% (Hakimov and
Kübler 2019). In addition to Boston and New York
City, variants of DA have been implemented in
Amsterdam, Denver, Hungary, Paris, New Orleans,
and Taiwan.
In the tradeoff between elimination of justified
envy and Pareto efficiency, DA gives up Pareto effi-
ciency. The TTC mechanism, on the other hand, gives
up elimination of justified envy but is Pareto efficient.
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In each round of the TTC algorithm, each student
points to her favorite school among schools that re-
main, whereas each school points to the applicant
who has the highest priority at that school among the
remaining applicants. A cycle of students and schools
pointing at each other is called a top trading cycle.
Every student in a cycle is assigned to the school she is
pointing to. These students and their assignments are
removed from the allocation process. School capacity
is updated. The algorithm terminates when each
student is assigned a school seat or all school seats
are assigned.
The TTC mechanism is not only Pareto efficient
but also strategy-proof. In the laboratory, however,
without prompting from the experimenters, some-
time up to one third of the subjects manipulate their
preferences (Chen and Sönmez 2006).
In theory, TTC has an efficiency advantage over IA
and DA: The outcome of IA is Pareto efficient if
participants reveal their preferences truthfully. Any
efficiency loss in IA is a consequence of preference
manipulation. DA, on the other hand, is strategy-
proof, but elimination of justified envy and Pareto
efficiency are not compatible. Because DA Pareto
dominates any other mechanism that eliminates justi-
fied envy, any efficiency loss in DA is a consequence of
this incompatibility.
In practice, the only public school district that
implemented TTC as its school choice mechanism
is the New Orleans Recovery School District (RSD).
However, one year after its implementation, the
RSD switched to DA, citing the difficulty to explain
TTC to parents and the lack of stability as main
reasons for the switch. Using data from New Orleans,
Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2017) find that the switch to
DA had little impact on the overall aggregate rank
distribution of choices received by applicants; how-
ever, no student is involved in a blocking pair as a
result of the switch. Based on the revealed preferences
of officials in both the Boston andNewOrleans public
schools, one cannot help but notice that they seem to
put more weight on stability, guaranteed by DA,
compared with efficiency, guaranteed by TTC. The
lack of stability might create blocking pairs, which
might lead to legal challenges to the school district.
Last, in the fall of 2009, without the involvement of
market design researchers, Chicago Public Schools
decided to replace its highly manipulable matching
algorithm for exam schools, a variant of IA, with a
less manipulable mechanism, a capped version of the
serial dictatorship (Pathak and Sönmez 2013).
In sum, market design in the school choice domain
is considered a success story, with many active re-
search projects investigating school choice mecha-
nisms around the world. In many cases, researchers
are directly involved in the design of better matching
algorithms, whereas in other cases, officials from
public school districts abandon problematic match-
ing algorithms in favor of less manipulable ones.
4.2. Redesign Centralized College
Admissions Mechanisms
Like school choice, college admissions policies have
been subject to debate and reform inmany countries.9
In particular, many countries use centralized college
admissions through standardized tests, includingChina,
Greece, Hungary, Russia, and Turkey. In what follows,
we discuss the role of matching theory and experiments
in the understanding the recent college admissions re-
forms in China.
In China, centralized matching processes via stan-
dardized tests assigning students to universities have
been in place since 1952. The National College Entrance
Examination forms the foundation for the current college
admissions system. In recent years, roughly 10 million
high school seniors compete for 6million seats at various
Chinese universities each year. Thematching of students
to universities has profound implications for the edu-
cation and labor market outcomes for these students.
Through its regional variations and its evolution over
time, the Chinese system also provides matching
theorists and experimentalists with a wealth of field
observations to enrich our understanding of match-
ing mechanisms.
In recent years, each province implements an in-
dependent matching process from one of the two
classes of mechanisms: the sequential or the parallel
mechanism. The sequential mechanism, strategically
equivalent to the IA mechanism, had been the only
mechanismused in Chinese student assignments both
at the high school and college level until 2000 (Nie 2007).
However, this mechanism is not strategy-proof: “a
good score in the college entrance exam is worth less
than a good strategy in the ranking of colleges” (Nie
2007, p. 23).
To alleviate the problem of high-scoring students
not being accepted by any universities, the parallel
mechanism (PA) was first implemented in Hunan
Province in 2001. In the parallel mechanism, students
select several parallel colleges within each choice-
band. For example, a student’s first choice-band may
contain a set of three colleges, A, B, andC,whereas her
second choice-band may contain another set of three
colleges, D, E, and F (in decreasing desirability within
each band). Assignments for parallel colleges listed in
the same band are considered temporary until all
choices of that band have been considered. Thus, this
mechanism lies between IA, where every choice is
final, and DA, where every choice is temporary until
all seats are filled.
By 2019, all 31 provinces and autonomous regions
had abandoned the sequential in favor of various
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versions of the PA, which is widely perceived to
improve allocation outcomes for students. These vari-
ants of PA are differentiated by the number of parallel
colleges a student can list within a choice-band.
To investigate the theoretical properties of the PAs,
Chen and Kesten (2017) formulate a parametric family
of application-rejectionmechanismswhere eachmember
characterized their parallel and periodic choice-band
sizes that allow the application and rejection process
to continue before assignments are made permanent. As
the choice-band size increases, we go from IA to PA, and
fromthose toDA.They show thatmembersof this family
become less manipulable in the sense of Pathak and
Sönmez (2013) and more stable as the choice-band
size increases. This implies that the Chinese provinces
that have adopted a parallel mechanism have transi-
tioned to a less manipulable and more stable assign-
ment system.
Furthermore, Chen and Kesten (2017) show that a
PAmechanism provides students with a certain sense
of insurance by allowing them to list their equilibrium
assignments under the IA mechanism as a safety
option while listing more desirable options higher up
in their preferences. This strategy leads to an outcome
at least as good as that of the IA mechanism. Notably,
such insurance does not come at any ex ante welfare
cost in a stylized setting.
To investigate behavioral responses to these mecha-
nisms and to search for behavioral regularities where
theory is silent, Chen and Kesten (2019) evaluate the
IA, PA, and DA mechanisms in the laboratory in two
environments differentiated by their complexity. In
the laboratory, participants are most likely to reveal
their preferences truthfully under DA, followed by
PA and then IA. Furthermore, although DA is sig-
nificantly more stable than PA, which is more stable
than IA, efficiency comparisons vary across envi-
ronments. Whereas theory is silent about equilibrium
selection, they find that stable Nash equilibrium
outcomes are more likely to arise than unstable ones.
Regardless of the metrics, the performance of PA is
robustly sandwiched between IA and DA.
One type of strategy implied by proposition 5 in
Chen andKesten (2017) is an insurance strategy. In the
six-school environment in Chen and Kesten (2019),
students’ district school position varies from the
second to the fifth position. A student has a high priority
in her district school and low priority elsewhere. To
insure that a student gets a school at least as good
as her district school, she can put her district school as
her second choice and a more preferred school as her
first choice, called an insurance strategy. Within this
subset, if a student lists her most preferred school as
her first choice and her district school as her second
choice,we label it as the insurance and targeting strategy.
Figure 4 presents the proportion of students adopting
district school bias (DSB, ranking one’s district school
higher than its true position), insurance, and insur-
ance and targeting strategies over time. By the last
period, 58%, 53%, and 29% of the subjects adopt DSB,
insurance, and insurance and targeting strategies,
respectively. That is, 91.4% (respectively, 50%) of
those who use DSB actually use the insurance (re-
spectively, insurance and targeting) strategy, confirming
both the popular perception and the theoretical char-
acterization of the insurance property of PA. These re-
sults help explain the recent reforms in Chinese school
choice and college admissions.
In practice,we observed changeswithin the parallel
family. For example, Hunan Province pioneered the
parallel mechanism in 2001, which allowed three
parallel choices per choice-band. Later, it switched
to a different parallel mechanism allowing five par-
allel choices per choice-band in 2010. Using admis-
sions data from Hunan, Wei (2015) find that, by
2013, the new parallel mechanism with a choice-band
size of five is significantly more stable than the old
parallel mechanism with a choice-band size of three.
In future studies, it would be desirable to pick more
members to investigate the performance of different
PA mechanisms.
Researchers have also examined other aspects of
the Chinese college admissions mechanism, such as
the timing of preference submission by students.
Recent empirical and experimental studies such as Wu
and Zhong (2014), Lien et al. (2016), and Jiang (2016)
find that if students submit preferences before tak-
ing the examination, the measurement error in the
examination can be corrected via IA, which leads
to matchings that are stable with regard to stu-
dents’ aptitudes.
Figure 4. Proportion of Students Adopting District School
Bias, Insurance, and Insurance and Targeting Strategies
Under the Chinese Parallel Mechanism in Chen and
Kesten (2019)
Source. Reproduced from Chen and Kesten (2019).
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In sum, there has been a fair amount of progress
made in understanding and testing various aspects of
centralized college admissions mechanisms. Because
of the large number of choices available for central-
ized college admissions, it remains a challenge to
design optimal matching mechanisms that simulta-
neously provide information to guide the application
process and reduce the students’ cognitive load in
preference reporting.
4.3. Improving Course Allocation Mechanisms
Allocating course seats to students is a daunting task
each university face every semester. It is a technically
difficult problem in market design, because it in-
volves assigning each student a package of indivisible
goods among many classes where some are substi-
tutes and others are complements. The course allo-
cation problem is closely tied to the combinatorial
auction problem discussed in Section 2.2. A critical
theoretical distinction is the presumption of quasi-
linear utility in the auction problem, which is typi-
cally not used in matching markets.
To achieve the goals of efficiency and equity, some
business schools use preference-ranking mechanisms
(revealed ordinal preferences), whereas others use
variants of bidding systems (revealed cardinal pref-
erences) in which students are given a fixed budget of
tokens to bid on courses. In such bidding systems,
bids serve the dual roles of inferring student prefer-
ences over courses and determining student priorities
for courses. Similar market-like mechanisms with
tokens have been proposed and tested to solve re-
source allocation problems for organizational com-
puting (Ledyard 1993, (Olson and Porter 1994) and for
scarce scientific and engineering resources (Takeuchi
et al. 2010), as well as for prediction markets within
firms (Arrow et al. 2008).
Sönmez and Ünver (2010) present a theoretical
analysis of course bidding, where they show that
these dual roles may easily conflict. That is, prefer-
ences inferred from the bids might differ signifi-
cantly from students’ true preferences. Furthermore,
they propose the Gale-Shapley student-optimal sta-
ble mechanism (DA) that can be implemented by
asking students for their preferences in addition to
their bids over courses. The DA mechanism operates
as follows in this context. In thefirst step, each student
is tentatively placed in her top three choices from her
preference list. If a course has more students than its
capacity, students with the lowest bids for that course
are dropped. A student rejected from a course is
tentatively placed in her next choice course, and so on.
The algorithm terminateswhen no student is dropped
from a course, or all options on the students’ pref-
erence list are exhausted. The tentative assignments
become final.
To compare the new mechanism with the existing
bidding system, Krishna and Ünver (2008) report a
field study complemented by a laboratory experiment
at the Ross School of Business at the University of
Michigan,which uses a course-bidding system. In this
system, each student is endowed with a fixed budget
of bidding points, which they can allocate among
courses they are interested in. Students are then
sorted in decreasing order by the points they place in a
course, which generates a priority list. A serial dic-
tatorship mechanism is executed in priority order,
subject to course quota and feasibility constraints. The
field study involves a personalized email sent to each
student within a few hours of the official closure of
course bidding. The email contains a list of all courses
on which the student had placed bids in descending
order of bid points and asks students to rank the
courses. Their counterfactual analysis using DA con-
cludes that a potential transition toDA is likely to lead to
significant efficiency improvement: among the 489 stu-
dents who submitted a rank-ordered list, 101 of them
unambiguously prefer DA, whereas 2 strictly prefer the
status quo. The others are indifferent. In a complemen-
tary laboratory experiment using the induced value
method, the authors again find an improvement in ef-
ficiency under DA. Depending on the metric used,
truthful preference revelation under DA is between 67%
and 83%. Despite the evidence that switching to DA
would improve the satisfaction level of many students,
theRoss School of Business at theUniversity ofMichigan
continues to use the course-bidding system.
A second example of the course-bidding system is
usedbyHarvardBusiness School. Budish andCantillon
(2012) document how it encouraged strategic be-
havior and often failed to produce efficient outcomes.
To address these deficiencies, Budish (2011) proposes a
new allocation mechanism that elicits from students
their preferences over bundles of courses and uses
these preferences to compute a price for each course
that would form an approximate competitive equi-
librium from equal income (A-CEEI). At these prices,
each student receives her most preferred bundle of
courses that she could afford. As the number of
participants grows large, the amount of approxima-
tion and the incentives to misrepresent preferences
would become small. The main advance of Budish
(2011) compared with Sönmez and Ünver (2010) is
to allow students to express preferences over bundles
of courses rather than individual courses, thus cap-
turing potential substitutability or complementarity
among various courses.
To implement A-CEEI in practice, market designers
need to deal with the issue of preference reporting
over bundles of courses, which would be prohibi-
tively large. A practical mechanism will necessar-
ily use a simplified preference reporting language,
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which in turn raises the empirical question of how well
the restricted preferences approximate true preferences.
The first experimental investigation and subsequent
implementation of A-CEEI took place in the Wharton
Business School at the University of Pennsylvania.
Before 2013, the Wharton Business School used a
course-bidding system called the Wharton Auction.
In a paper in Management Science, Budish and
Kessler (2019) report a novel laboratory experiment
that compares the performance of A-CEEI with the
existing Wharton Auction. There are several inter-
esting features in the experiment design. For example,
subjects are Wharton MBA students who have ex-
perience with the Wharton Auction and who would
be the future users of A-CEEI if it were adopted.
Instead of endowing these subjects with artificially
induced values (Smith 1982), they bring their real
preferences into the laboratory. Specifically, subjects
report preferences over a subset of courses to be of-
fered the following semester, making it a realistic task.
An innovation in thepreference reporting language is the
use of binary comparisons, in the formof “Do you prefer
Schedule A or Schedule B?,”which is cognitively simple
comparedwith rankingover all possible schedules. They
find that A-CEEI outperformed the incumbent Wharton
Auction on measures of efficiency and fairness.
The experimental results helped persuade the Whar-
ton committee to adopt A-CEEI and guide its practical
implementation. The newmechanism is implemented as
CourseMatch, which has replaced theWharton Auction
since 2013. Survey data suggest that A-CEEI has in-
creased student satisfaction with their assigned sched-
ule (Budish et al. 2017).
4.4. Future Directions: Dynamic Mechanisms and
Information Intervention
With the advent of the World Wide Web and the
computerization of most matching markets, practi-
tioners, with or without the help of market designers,
sometimes introduce new matching mechanisms or
new features to existing matching mechanisms that
take advantage of the low cost of information gath-
ering and dissemination over the Web. These new
features, enabled by information technology, might
shape the future of matching market design. Sum-
marizing emergent research on matching markets
around the world, we highlight two directions for
future research.
The first direction is dynamic matching market
design. Although most existing research in the school
choice and college admissions domain analyzes the
static version of the matching mechanisms, we notice
dynamic variants of these mechanisms being im-
plemented that provide information about others’
behavior and allow students to revise their own ap-
plications on observing others’ actions. Examples
include school choice in Amsterdam (de Haan et al.
2016) and Wake County, North Carolina (Dur et al.
2018), where students (or parents) can revise their
choice based on feedback on others’ choices. In the
context of the Japanese ResidencyMatching Program,
applicants can check the number of students listing each
hospital program as their first choice and revise their
rank order list within a prespecified time window.
In the college admissions context, a more radical
dynamic matching market starts to emerge in the
form of the dynamically adjusted admission cutoffs at
each college during a prespecified time frame in the
college admissions process in Inner Mongolia (Gong
and Liang 2019) and Brazil (Bó and Hakimov 2020).
During this process, students can revise their appli-
cations continuously upon observing others’ actions.
Although research analyzing existing information
provisionmechanisms inmatching demonstrates that
it improves the performance of these mechanisms
comparedwith their static counterparts, it remains an
open question what the optimal dynamic matching
mechanisms might be.
A second promising direction is related to infor-
mation intervention before the matching stage. When
choosing a school or college, students often have
imperfect information about their own preferences
regarding candidate schools, partly because it is difficult
to assess the potential educational outcomes each school
provides (Dustan et al. 2015). Unfortunately, acquir-
ing this information can be costly if a student faces too
many choices or must acquire information about
several factors, such as academic performance, teacher
quality, school facilities, extracurricular activities of-
fered, and peer quality. Chen and He (2019, 2020) in-
vestigate how two popular mechanisms, IA and DA,
incentivize students’ information acquisition theo-
retically and in the laboratory. Although students’
willingness to pay for information is significantly
greater under IA than DA, as predicted by theory,
most students’ information acquisition behavior is far
from optimal. Their counterfactual analyses show
that providing information on both a student’s own
and others’ preferences is welfare-enhancing. Fur-
thermore, students who never invest in information
acquisition benefit equally from information provision.
In light of these results, the new dynamic matching
mechanisms partially serve the function of information
provision about others’ preferences.
To reduce inequality in access to education re-
sources, information intervention before students’
entry into matching markets might be an effective
policy, because the cost of information acquisition is
particularly harmful to low-income students. Indeed,
research has shown that, because of limited infor-
mation, low-income high achievers in the United States
tend not to apply to selective colleges, despite that
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generous financial aid makes these colleges more fi-
nancially accessible than the colleges these students
end up choosing (Hoxby and Avery 2013, Hoxby and
Turner 2015). Information intervention can therefore
substantially raise the number of applications from
these students to selective colleges. In a natural field
experiment conducted in the state of Michigan, Dynarski
et al. (2018) contacted low-income, high-achieving
public high school students, their parents, and princi-
pals with an encouragement to apply to the University
of Michigan and a promise of four years of free tuition
and fees on admission. They find that treated students
weremore than twice as likely to apply to and enroll at
the University of Michigan, with no diversion from
schools as (or more) selective as Michigan. Further-
more, this application tendency is not limited to college
selection. Similar undermatching phenomena are ob-
served among low-income families in public school
choice plans (Hastings and Weinstein 2008). Future
research on effective policies to reduce information
frictions can lead to substantial welfare gain.
5. Labor Market
The labor market represents a rich assortment of
opportunities for the scientist andmanager to explore
ways to improve existing conditions. Within economics,
a myriad of research questions is addressed by labor
economists today, yet the bulk of work revolves around
three bins: (i) labor supply, (ii) labor demand, and (iii) the
organization of labor markets and behavioral incentives
therein.There is bynowenoughwork in these threeareas
to fill at least a hundred factual tomes. In this section, we
limit our attention to a subset of the third bin: exploring
select recent work on the effects of market design and
pecuniary incentives on worker behavior and the in-
terplay between pecuniary and nonpecuniary incentives
(the interested reader should see List and Rasul 2011
for a discussion of the other two bins). We then ex-
plore challenges moving forward and our vision of
the next set of frontiers.
A core feature of economics is that incentives matter.
The key is to understandwhat sorts of incentives matter,
and how, to individuals. Although the role of pecuniary
incentives within firms has been long studied in the
sociology andmanagement literature,within economics,
the stream of work has its roots in contract theory. The
basic questions for economists then revolve around how
workers respond to incentives and the optimal design of
those incentives. Early empirical work used personnel
data to measure the effects of compensation on indi-
vidual productivity levels, but a difficult econometric
challenge arose as most (all?) observed incentive con-
tracts in naturally occurring settings are endogenous,
making causality difficult to establish. Economic ex-
periments introduce exogeneity in incentives that are
by design orthogonal to other management practices,
opening the possibility of identifying the causal rela-
tionship between pecuniary incentives and effort levels
of individualworkers.We take this literatureasa starting
point to discusswork on howmarket design can be used
to improve the workplace, with each of the bins show-
cased by laboratory and field experiments.
5.1. Putting Market Design to Work to Increase
Effort in the Workplace
Although designing individual incentive schemes,
such as clawback bonus contracts, have proven quite
fruitful, market design comes in many flavors. One
such example is rewarding employees based on rel-
ative payoffs (tournaments), which are ubiquitous
in the workplace. Job promotions, earning bonuses,
employee of the month, and the like all revolve
around relative assessment of workers. The literature
on the market design of tournaments has witnessed
deep contributions theoretically, showcasing the benefits
and costs of relative performance incentives (Lazear and
Rosen 1981, Holmstrom 1982). However, empirically
testing the theoretical predictions has proven quite
difficult, as observing individual effort, the main
outcome variable in the theory, has been elusive in
field settings.
One focus, therefore, has been to use laboratory
experiments that are able to measure effort directly. An
early experiment in this spirit is from Bull et al. (1987).
They design a laboratory experiment with student
subjects to explore the first-order predictions from
tournament models concerning effort provision. In
practice, the object of choice in the experiment is
asking the student to circle a number that represents
their effort choice, with higher numbers yielding a
better chance of winning but being more costly in a
convex manner. This effort choice is then added to an
idiosyncratic shock, or luck component, that is uni-
formly distributed, and their sum determines the
tournament outcome.
This approach, importantly and cleverly, embeds
the essential elements of the tournament theory in the
effort choice setting. Bull et al. (1987) find that, al-
though there is considerable noise in individual play,
effort levels converge to theoretical predictions in
aggregate. That is, although individual effort level
choices in the laboratory are quite noisily distributed
around the equilibrium prediction, in aggregate, the
theory performs remarkably well: a key win for
the theory.
Following Bull et al. (1987), subsequent work has
explored beyond equilibrium play to examine how
other factors, such as selection (Camerer and Lovallo
1999, Eriksson et al. 2009, Cason et al. 2010, Müller
and Schotter 2010, Faravelli et al. 2015), feedback
(Blanes and Nossol 2011), sabotage (Harbring and
Irlenbusch 2008, Harbring and Irlenbusch 2011),
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dynamic tournaments (Casas-Arce andMartı́nez-Jerez
2009, Sheremeta 2010, Brown and Minor 2014, Liu
et al. 2014, Mostagir et al. 2019), and sex (Gneezy et al.
2003, Dargnies 2012), affect individual effort level
choices in tournaments.
In addition to the aforementioned factors, there is
also a large experimental literature focusing on the
effect of tournament size and prize structure. For
instance, Sheremeta (2011) finds that the average
effort per participant is lower in four player contests
than in two player contests. Using experiments with
different group sizes, Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006)
and Morgan et al. (2012) find further evidence that
average individual effort decreases with the number of
players. Conversely, Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003)
examine rank order tournaments and find the average
effort increasing with the number of players. Also
examining rankorder tournaments,Orrison et al. (2004)
vary the fraction of winner and loser prizes in tour-
naments of different sizes and find no trend relating
effort with the size of the contest when the luck term is
uniformly distributed.
Further expanding this literature to field settings,
List et al. (2020) use complementary laboratory and
field experiments to analyze how the number of
competitors, or the size of tournament, affects effort
levels under different distributions of luck.10 In the
previous literature, the key assumption that the luck
term is drawn from a uniform distribution makes this
particular question moot when workers are risk neutral,
because thenumberof entrants in this casedoesnot affect
equilibrium effort levels. However, there are several
instances where such an assumption need not hold.
Indeed, in important ways, endogenizing the number of
players allowed to enter the tournament becomes an
interesting market design consideration, as was seem-
ingly anticipated by the English poetMilton (1628), who
once quipped that “luck is the residue of design.”11
Consider the thought experiment of a worker in-
novating on the jobwith one prize awarded to the best
innovator. Suppose that there are many potentially
successful innovation paths, and workers arbitrarily
choose a path. Each worker then expects to be a
successful innovator, but she also expects that at least
one other worker will be successful too. Hence, effort
is crucial in determining the winning innovator, and
investment is high (and even higher if the number of
competitors expands). Alternatively, suppose that
workers believe the chance of developing a very
successful product are small. In that case, they expect
that luck will play a crucial role in selecting the
winner. If there are many innovators, each worker
knows that at least one of them will be lucky but also
knows that it is unlikely that it will be them. Because
luck is much more important in selecting the winner
than effort in this case, workers invest little effort,
instead relying on luck to determine the winner. This
result is exacerbated as the number of competitors in-
creases, leading to an even lower level of investment as
the number of competitors increases. Several real-world
examples abound, from development of autonomous
vehicles to finding medicinal drug breakthroughs.
The theory of List et al. (2020) highlights these in-
tuitions and shows that if the distribution of the
uncertainty component is skewed, the number of
competitors allowed in the competition has a critical
influence on equilibrium effort levels. As the number
of competitors increases, a worker’s equilibrium ef-
fort level (i) decreases if there is small mass on good
luck, (ii) remains constant if the luck component is
drawn from a uniform density, and (iii) increases if
there is a largemass on good luck. The intuition is that
the marginal benefit from committing effort depends
on both the number of competitors and on the good
draw mass, which depends critically on the density
function’s slope.
The empirical approach of List et al. (2020) to test
the theory begins in the laboratory and closely fol-
lows the approach of Bull et al. (1987). This permits a
study of labor markets that differ only in the shape of
the density function, allowing a unique insight into
whether changes in the component’s shape itself can
lead to predicted behavioral changes. Their second
empirical approach is to use a field experiment that
resembles the important features of the theory but
maintains enough control to allow a formal test of the
theory. In doing so, it is important to create an ex-
perimental design that exogenously varies theirmajor
treatment variable—number of competitors—in an
environment that permits an understanding of the
other important features of the situation.
This is not simple because one needs to find a
naturally occurring environment where the random
stochastic component takes a shape that is well un-
derstood by the participants. List et al. (2020) ended
up choosing recreational commercial fisherman, where
the private ponds were stocked with rainbow trout or
salmon trout. Importantly, the fishing pond permits a
natural test of the theory for the case of a decreasing
density function. This is because of the fish schooling:
the density function of luck is decreasing because
schools never cover more than just a few rectangles of
where the competitors are placed, and hence the amount
of mass on having good luck is quite small.
Overall, the laboratory results are in line with the
tournament theory. Most importantly, they report
that when exploring tournaments with two, three,
and four players, the impact of group size on effort is
consonant with theory. The field experimental results
complement these insights by providing evidence
consonant with the theory within a special case of the
theory—when thedensity function is negatively skewed.
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In this case, the author’s report evidence that adding
competitors decreases individual effort levels espe-
cially when they control for fatigue.
Beyond testing theory, the received results enhance
the manager’s choice set by showing that the number
of competitors in a relative pay incentive scheme has
important effects on individual effort levels. Methodo-
logically, the study showcases the power of testing the
theory using complementary laboratory and field ex-
periments within the same study (rather than across
studies as shown in the loss aversion experiments).
First, using an artificial setting that permits an exami-
nation of markets that differ only in the shape of the
density function allows a test of such effects that would
bedifficult to identify innaturally occurringdata. Pairing
that with a second empirical approach that maintains
randomization, and closely resembles the important fea-
tures of the theory, as a field test provides much stronger
inference of the underlying data patterns than either the
laboratory or field approach could provide in isolation.
5.2. Understanding Nonpecuniary Incentives in the
Workplace: From Gift Exchange to Corporate
Social Responsibility
Perhaps the least understood aspect of the designer’s
quiver is how nonpecuniary incentives work in labor
markets. However, recent literature is beginning to
provide insight into this fascinating area. A few ex-
amples include Bradler et al. (2016) and Gallus (2017),
who use field experiments to explore the power of
employee recognition on employee performance. The
results are impressive; for example, the Wikipedia
natural field experiment of Gallus (2017) shows that
her symbolic awards have a sizeable effect on new-
comer retention,whichpersists over a spanof fourquarters.
Likewise, Cohn et al. (2015) reveal how the percep-
tions of the fairness of pay affects effort provision.
Relatedly, field experimental research into uncon-
ditional gifts in the workplace is a burgeoning area of
research—see Gneezy and List’s (2006) surprise pay
raises, pay cuts in Kube et al. (2013), and in-kind gifts
in Kube et al. (2012). Recent work on corporate social
responsibility (CSR) highlights that gifts for the social
good can also have important labor market effects
(Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2015, List and Momeni
2020). In this section, we focus attention to these
two strands of research: gift exchange and CSR.
5.2.1. Gift Exchange. A common result that is found in
large data sets is that employers are observed paying
above the market equilibrium wage. When effort is
monitored, workers exert more than the minimum
effort level. This empirical observation has induced a
set of economic models based on the assumption of
there being a positive relationship between worker
wages and effort levels (Akerlof 1982, Akerlof and
Yellen 1990). The equilibrium of these models is for
employers to offer higher than market clearing wages
and for workers to reciprocate with high effort levels,
making the situation a win-win for principal and agent.
Within experimental economics, the literature on
social preferences has become one of the most in-
fluential areas of research (Camerer andWeigelt 1988,
Fehr et al. 1993, Levitt and List 2007, Cooper and
Kagel 2016). Findings from such games have been
interpreted as providing strong evidence that many
agents behave in a reciprocal manner even when the
behavior is costly and yields neither present nor fu-
ture material rewards. That workers respond posi-
tively to employers who offer a generous wage has
been heavily documented in the laboratory, sug-
gesting that reciprocity itself can function as a pow-
erful incentive for employers to deviate from purely
selfish behavior (Fehr et al. 1997, Fehr and Falk 1999).
As a result, reciprocity has been found to explain
employer generosity and worker cooperation in the
presence of incomplete contracts (Fehr and Falk 1999,
Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). Even beyond one-shot
laboratory games, reciprocity and repeated game
incentives have been found to reinforce each other
(Gächter and Falk 2001). Moreover, the potential for
employers to again reciprocate worker generosity by
positively or negatively altering worker payoffs has
been found to increase workers’ effort levels (Fehr
et al. 1997). Fehr and Falk (2008) provide a compre-
hensive summary of studies that show a sustained
deviation from equilibriumwages and effort levels in
experimental markets.
Ultimately, social preferences such as reciprocity
can behave as a contract enforcement device that
raises efficiency gains, and a well-designed market
must carefully acknowledge the contextual influence
of such forces (see Section 3). Fehr and Falk (2002)
show that in addition to contract and principal-agent
theory, nonpecuniary incentives significantly shape
human behavior. In fact, policies that align financial
incentives with social objectives have been found in
some situations to lead to inefficient outcomes by
crowding out other-regarding preferences (Bowles
and Hwang 2008). Bowles and Gintis (2013) pro-
vide a taxonomy of cooperative and generous be-
havior not explained by conventional self-interest
hypotheses. Similarly, various studies provide models
and evidence of altruistic behavior largely explained
by strong reciprocity, a predisposition to cooperate
but also to punish those who fail to conform to the
norms of cooperation (Bowles and Gintis 2004, Fehr
and Fischbacher 2005, Gintis et al. 2008, Bowles and
Gintis 2013, Mussweiler and Ockenfels 2013). Pun-
ishment and retaliation are further discussed as strong
reciprocity enforcement devices (Fehr and Gächter
2000b, 2002; Fehr and Falk 2002).
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These results have been widely applied outside the
laboratory, becoming a descriptor of environments
far removed from the domains of data generation. An
early study exploring the importance of gift exchange
in a naturally occurring market is List (2006), who
used a series of field experiments in a product market
to show that inference from these early games should
be made with care because the environment might
engender certain behaviors and that strategic reci-
procity might masquerade as social preferences in
certain instances.
Gneezy and List (2006) took this notion to the
workplace by exploring the effects of gift exchange on
worker productivity. They use two natural field ex-
periments to explore gift exchange in the workplace.
In the first, they recruited undergraduate students to
participate in computerizing the holdings of a small
library at the University of Chicago. In the no-gift
treatment, individuals were offered a flat wage of $12
per hour. In the gift treatment, once the task was
explained to participants, they were surprisingly
paid $20 per hour rather than $12 per hour as ad-
vertised. The second field experiment was part of a
door-to-door fundraising drive to support a uni-
versity research center in North Carolina. Fund-
raising solicitors were recruited and told theywould
be paid $10 per hour, and those in the gift treat-
ment were surprisingly told they would receive $20
per hour.
The main results from the library task are sum-
marized in Figure 5. Two stark patterns are revealed
in Figure 5. First, in linewith earlier evidence from the
laboratory, there are signs of significant gift exchange
in the first few hours of the task. Second, there is a
significant decrease in the gift exchange effect after a
few hours, with no significant differences existing
over a longer period. Importantly, the data reveal
how the gift worked early on to induce higher output,
but overall, the results show that with the same
budget, the employer would have been better off
paying market wages.12
Since this earlywork, the evidence on the efficacy of
gift exchange in the workplace has come in various
forms. Kube et al. (2012) find similar short run effect
sizes as Gneezy and List (2006) using an in-kind gift.
Likewise, using a negative wage gift, Kube et al. (2013)
find a similarly large treatment effect when consid-
ering decreases in productivity. Alternatively, there
are studies that report small and statisticallyweak gift
exchange effects. For instance, Al-Ubaydli et al. (2015)
report small effects despite that gifts used in their
study were large: paying unskilled workers $18 an
hour to pack envelopes. To reconcile the various facts
around gift exchange in the workplace, Esteves-Sorenson
(2018) carefully identifies several factors that could be
underlying the inconsistent results. She concludes
that “after dealing with all these confounds, our field
test results aremost consistentwith a standardmodel:
workers did not increase effort in response to fixed
wage raises but did do so in response to a piece rate
scheme” (p. 2). In this way, her results are quite con-
sonant with the long-term estimates from Gneezy and
List (2006). We return to the important question of in-
ference from this body of work at the end of this section.
5.2.2. CSR. The role of CSR has been debated at least
since Friedman famously described CSR as a funda-
mentally subversive doctrine in a 2007 New York Times
article. In his usual combative style, Friedman de-
scribed contrarians to his views on CSR as “puppets
of the intellectual forces that have been undermining
the basis of a free society” (Friedman 2007, p. 1). In this
regard, the world has certainly turned its cheek to
Friedman’s advice, as today more than 90% of major
businesses have specific programs dedicated to CSR.
However, is this transformation a sign that the CSR
business is a good business?
For their part, researchers have explored the effi-
cacy of CSR in various venues. Broadly, most studies
have focused on the demand side of the market, ex-
amining whether consumers are moved by the CSR
programs of firms. Alternatively, only until recently
has work begun to focus on the supply side to de-
termine whether employees are affected by CSR. In
this spirit, the notion of examining the supply side
resembles gift exchange, except in this case, workers
reciprocate higher effort when the firm does good for
the society at large rather than for themselves directly.
Defined narrowly, thus far there exists little con-
sensus on whether CSR investments positively im-
pact the bottom line. Although some studies report a
positive effect (Waddock and Graves 1997), others
find mixed effects (Servaes and Tamayo 2013). As
mentioned previously, however, one possible reason
for these mixed findings is that, with few exceptions,
empirical studies of CSR tend to focus primarily on
the demand side of the market (Du et al. 2011).
Figure 5. Average Books Logged per Time Period
Source. Reproduced from Gneezy and List (2006).
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In a study in Management Science, List and Momeni
(2020) address this shortcoming in the literature by
exploring the supply side effects of CSR within an
online marketplace, with an emphasis placed on
observing misbehaviors in the workplace. List and
Momeni (2020) operationalized a test of CSR by
conducting a natural field experiment using workers
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). This ap-
proach has become a common one in the economics
community searching for convenience labor market
samples, because MTurk is an online labor market
platform where ads are made to available workers.
List and Momeni (2020) try to hire workers who land
on their website after seeing an advertisement for
work. On landing on their website, potential workers
were randomized into one of the six treatments that
had different wages and CSR language. In terms of
the basic contracts, people were told that 10% of the total
wage would be paid to workers upfront, and the re-
maining 90%would be paid after they completed the
task. Accepting the contract without completing the
task is one of two measures they use for worker mis-
behavior (because the worker is paid without delivery).
The task was for each worker to transcribe 10 im-
ages of short German texts, scanned from old German
books. On average, each image was composed of
around 30 words or 183 characters. The authors used
German texts to make the task harder and less en-
joyable. Workers who submitted all 10 images re-
ceived the full wage specified in the contract. Before
starting to work on any given image, workers were
required to report if the imagewas legible. If an image
was reported as unreadable, the worker skipped that
image and moved on to the next, yet still received full
pay. The second misbehavior naturally arises: Mis-
reporting perfectly readable images as unreadable to
avoid costly transcription was their second measure
of misbehavior.
AlthoughList andMomeni (2020) had six treatment
conditions, the main treatment comparisons for our pur-
poses were the outcomes of the baseline and a CSR treat-
ment that had an advertisement that was identical to
the baseline except included the following CSR message:
Our firm is committed to give back in meaningful
ways. We are passionate about encouraging education
for the next generation. We do our part by donating
money to influential non-profit organizations that
support education for children from low socioeco-
nomic backgrounds. In keeping with our philan-
thropic mission, we donate the equivalent of x% of our
wage bill in cash (on behalf of all workers who help us
with this project) to UNICEF Education Programs.
UNICEF works tirelessly to ensure that every child
regardless of gender, ethnicity or circumstances has
access to a quality education. You may find out more
about UNICEF Education Programs at: UNICEF.
The reported treatment effects are interesting, but
one stark set of results stands out: The firm’s use of
CSR increased worker misbehavior. More specifi-
cally, workers who received a CSR message were
more likely to become cheaters and cheated more
often than those whowere not incentivizedwith CSR.
The data pattern is consistent with a moral-licensing
impact: Doing good on one dimension (CSR work)
allows the worker to shirk on another (misbehaving).
Such an impact was anticipated by Bénabou and
Tirole (2010), who note that “people who have re-
cently done good in one dimension may feel immu-
nized against negative (social or self) inferences, and
thus later on act less morally constrained” (p. 6). The
results raise the potential that, although CSR could very
well have positive selection effects, there is a dark side of
CSR that should be understood.Morework is necessary.
5.3 Leveraging Behavioral Economics to Get More
for Your Money in the Workplace
Behavioral economics has become much more than
academic curiosity. Today, organizations as distinct
as governments and firms use behavioral insights to
chart a course of action. Although sister disciplines as
varied as sociology, biology, and computer sciences
have lent insight into the economic explorations, it is
fair to say that, to date, psychology has made the
deepest inroads in the behavioral economic revolu-
tion. This is because of the piercing nature of the
received insight. For example, one of the deepest eco-
nomic tenets—the basic independence assumption—
has been under attack since the early experimental
findings from the laboratory and field suggested that
preferences are a function of current entitlements
(Kahneman et al. 1990, List 2003). The most accepted
theory explaining such behavior is broadly termed
loss aversion.
One recent example leveraging loss aversion in the
workplace is an eight-week-long field experiment
from Hossain and List (2012). They explore whether
worker productivity can be affected using simple loss
averse framing of bonuses. In thismanner, the treatment
is particularly passive in comparison with previous
field experiments that manipulated real endowments
and explored choices (List 2004, 2011; Engelmann and
Hollard 2010). For instance, in the main treatments,
workers in the field experiment of Hossain and List
(2012) received letters in the mail announcing the
treatment. In the clawback treatment, for example, rather
than giving the employees the bonus money before the
work week commenced, it was given provisionally,
where the relevant portion of the letter read as follows:
“for every week in which the weekly production av-
erage of your team is below 400 units/hour, the salary
enhancement will be reduced by RMB 80 . . . .”
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Alternatively, in the standard bonus treatment, the
description read as follows:
“you will receive an RMB 80 bonus for every week the
weekly production average of your team is above or
equal to 400 units/hour . . .”
The setting in Hossain and List (2012) was a Chi-
nese manufacturing plant that produced consumer
electronics. The treatments were performed over both
individual and team production (these passages are
for the team setting). Hossain and List (2012) found
that bonuses work: Posed as either gains or losses,
workers in both teams and individually increased
productivity when they received a bonus. More im-
portantly for our purposes, they also find that teams
and individuals respond more to bonuses posed as
losses than as comparable bonuses posed as gains.
Figure 6 summarizes empirical results from the six
team sets in the field experiment of Hossain and
List (2012). Importantly, Figure 6 shows that in five
of six sets, the clawback treatment outperformed the
standard bonus treatment. Overall, team productiv-
ity increased by 1% purely because of the framing
manipulation. Comparable effects from the individual
treatments, reported in the bottompanel of Figure 6, are
of the same sign but are not statistically significantly
different to each other. Although Figure 6 does not
reveal the temporal treatment trends in the data,
importantly when considering the treatment effects
over time, the incentive effect does not wane: over the
six-month study period, the loss-averse effects re-
main in the data. Furthermore, these productivity
enhancements do not come with concomitant nega-
tive effects on the quality of work as measured by
defect rates.
Subsequent work has largely replicated these re-
sults (Fryer et al. 2012, Levitt et al. 2016, Imas et al.
2017, Bulte et al. 2019). Like Hossain and List (2012),
the main innovation in this literature is that agents
receive an upfront payment that they must return in
case their productivity or output fails tomeet a certain
threshold (i.e., a bonus scheme with upfront pay-
ments). Fryer et al. (2012), for example, provide pe-
cuniary incentives to grammar and high school teachers
to increase productivity asmeasuredby theperformance
of their students. Although standard bonuses fail to
increase teacher performance, leveraging the clawback
scheme is quite effective.13
On a practical note, these examples highlight the
interplay between pecuniary and nonpecuniary as-
pects of compensation in that this set of results shows
that, conditional on bonuses being provided, framing
matters. Given that framing can be adjusted cost-
lessly, these approaches are simple ways in which
firms can deepen the effects of pecuniary incentives.
Theoretically, these results from the field provide an
example consonant with loss aversion in a natural
labor market setting. As such, the results provide
concrete evidence of the generalizability of such in-
sights from laboratory evidence andprovide a natural
example highlighting the complementarity of labo-
ratory and field experiments.
5.4. Future Directions: Welfare, Structural Models,
and Opening the Black Box of the Firm
In summarizing the range of work discussed in this
section, several issues might have arisen to the astute
reader. Early on, one might have asked, although
these clawback incentives in Hossain and List (2012)
are neat, would any worker like them in practice?
That is, would the firm implementing such incentives
soon find itself employee-less? Or, perhaps less ex-
treme, maybe workers will remain in the firm but be
miserable. Likewise, in considering the effects of gift
exchange, one might wonder if the underlying mo-
tivations at work for the higher effort observed are
because of altruism, warm glow, reciprocity, or some
other consideration. Furthermore, in terms of market
design choices, the reader might have wondered how
CSR incentives affect other aspects of sorting, such
as whether more productive workers prefer to be
employed by firms that have a viable CSR program in
place. Do workers view CSR like other workplace
amenities, and what are the overall welfare effects
of CSR?
These, and related questions, are important chal-
lenges that future work should take on, but the ap-
proach need not be blind, becaue some first steps have
started to tackle these challenges. For example, one
natural question that arises when the literature pro-
duces an incentive regime that improves performance
is whether such a mechanism can be viewed as im-
provingoverallwelfare levels.Considering the clawback
scheme that leveragesworker loss aversion, the evidence
in Imas et al. (2017) and Bulte et al. (2019) suggests
that workers value the clawback as a commitment
device and therefore reciprocate by improving their
Figure 6. Aggregate Differences in Per-Hour Productivities
Under Punishment and Reward Treatments for Groups
Source. Reproduced from Hossain and List (2012).
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performance in subsequent interactions. This result
suggests that firms will not invoke anger or lose their
employees. Of course, more work is necessary to be
sure of such preliminary results, but this gives some
sense of optimism that the loss aversion nudge will
push workers to other firms. In this way, a call for
future research is to identify the overall welfare ef-
fects of nudges.
In terms of future research paths on gift exchange
literature, there is littlefield evidence about the nature
of the observed social preferences toward employers.
For instance, are workers acting on purely altruistic
motives as in Becker (1974). Perhaps instead, workers
are reacting to their warmglow in the spirit of Andreoni
(1989). Or, perhaps the actual model at work is the
original gift exchange view of Akerlof (1982). The
importance of parsing these underpinnings is not just
academic curiosity, because key market design con-
siderations critically rely on whether extra worker
effort is caused by enhanced value to the employer,
pure value to self, or is strategically reciprocal in
nature. However, there are many challenges to parsing
such models.
In this case, a structural model combined with field
experimental variation can provide insight. This is
exactly the roadmap provided by DellaVigna et al.
(2016), who combine a structural model with a closely
linked field experiment to explore the lessons learned
fromthe literature.What immediately falls out of such an
exercise is that the extant literature lacks the key design
features to parse the various interpretations. Two ele-
ments are missing from the designs in the literature:
(i) there is no specification of the value to the employer of
the worker’s effort and (ii) a key unobservable is the
cost of effort.
DellaVigna et al. (2016) design a field experiment to
address both issues, yielding insight into the un-
derlying primitives of workers. Their data and the-
oretical framework suggest that thewarmglowmodel is
key in explaining the received data in their setting. Im-
portantly, such insight would have been difficult to
obtain without the theoretical/experimental link offered
in the study to permit a firmer understanding of the
forces at work.
Hedblom et al. (2019) provide a similar contribu-
tion to the CSR literature, where they combine a
structural approachwith a natural field experiment to
consider how CSR affects sorting into the workplace.
Using data from more than 1,000 job seekers, they
report strong evidence on the efficacy of CSR: it at-
tracts employees who are more productive, produce
higher quality work, and have more highly valued
leisure time. In terms of enhancing the labor pool, use
of CSR increases the number of applicants by 25%, an
impact comparable to the effect of a 36% increase in
wages. This work balances the moral hazard effects
reported in List and Momeni (2020) and showcases
the key complementarities in CSR and pecuniary
incentives. In addition, this work provides compel-
ling reasons for why firms might create and actively
engage in CSR activities.We view these two examples
as representing a key call for future work that combines
the structural and field experimental approaches to shed
new insights into both old and new areas of study.
This line ofwork underscores the import of leveraging
firms and opening the black box of the firm. As Levitt
and List (2009) discuss, there have been three distinct
waves of field experimental research in economics.
We are currently in the thirdwave,which has brought
a deeper and broader exploration of economic phe-
nomena in organizations. Within this generation of
field experiments, an attractive approach is creating
partnerships with private entities. Low hanging fruit
remain in the areas of optimal worker incentive
schemes, workplace design, wellness and health pro-
grams, and several related topics in the black box of the
firm. One such area in the black box relates to a long-
standing puzzle in economics: the striking differences in
firm-level productivity across space and time.With total
factor productivity ratios about 3:1 across high pro-
ductivity and low productivity (90th percentile to 10th
percentile) firms, understanding their sources is of first-
order import. One such line of work considers man-
agement practice. Recently, rich literature has developed
that provides key evidence around management’s role
in such disparities (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007,
2011; Gosnell et al. 2019).Muchwork remains, andwe
envisage an active area for future work for decades
to come.
6. Concluding Remarks
In the last few decades, Management Science has pub-
lished foundational work in market design and hu-
man behavior, as outlined in our Introduction. Today,
economists, computer scientists, operations researchers,
managers, and others are increasingly asked to design
mechanisms for markets and organizations. Many of
the applications aremotivated by failures of incentives
in markets and organizations and the urgent need
to understand and fix the design flaws. One lesson
learned from these efforts, as selectively surveyed in
our article, is that institutional details matter. Even
small changes in the rules can have a dramatic impact
on the effectiveness and efficiency of a market. For
instance, whether an otherwise identical auction ends
with a hard or a soft close can significantly affect
bidding, revenues, and allocative efficiency. Market
design forces researchers to pay attention to details
that might otherwise be overlooked. Our survey il-
lustrates how the practical lessons frommarket design
activities in various contexts may accumulate to be-
come broad and sound scientific knowledge, which in
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turn promotes better and more reliable markets and
organizations.
Some critics sometimes complain that economic the-
ory is too disconnected from practical problems. How-
ever, in all cases that we survey, game theory proved
helpful to develop intuition and to address real-life
challenges. That said, market design may require deci-
sions that are beyond current knowledge. Part of the
reason is that theorymust abstract from institutional and
behavioral real-world complexities. For instance, people
often follow their own—bounded—rationality, char-
acterized by limitations of motivation, cognition, and
adaptation. Boundedly rational agents only have
limited cognitive abilities and bounded willpower,
which constrains optimally responding to auction and
matching mechanisms (Ockenfels and Selten 2005,
Engelbrecht-Wiggans andKatok 2008, Hassidim et al.
2016). Bounded self-interest implies that humans are
often willing to sacrifice their own interests to help
others, which is key for understanding how to en-
gineer trust in the gig economy (see Section 3). This is
why practical market design is often fruitfully com-
plemented by laboratory and field experiments that
test game theory’s predictions and provide a testbed
and proof of concept before introducing new mech-
anisms into operating markets. A mechanism that
works fine under simplifying assumptions about hu-
man behavior may fail under descriptively more rel-
evant assumptions.
Our survey includes discussion of where we find
gaps in our knowledge and where we believe more
research is promising for auction, matching, feed-
back, and labor market design. There is also more
general insight that holds across market design do-
mains. In some cases, for instance, markets with
theoretically attractive properties involve transac-
tions that are perceived by many as repugnant. This
can be an important constraint on market design. For
instance, buying and selling kidneys for transplan-
tation or trading school and university admission is
illegal inmost countries (Roth 2007). Thus, a stream of
recent studies is concerned with understanding the
empirical nature and robustness of such constraints to
reconcile ethical concerns with economic effective-
ness (Leider and Roth 2010; Ambuehl et al. 2015,
2019a, b; Kirchler et al. 2016; Ambuehl 2017).
Many opportunities and challenges in market de-
sign have to do with recent advances in computer and
communication technology, which often allow for
radical innovation in market design. Indeed, smart
markets are popping up everywhere, from new kidney
exchanges, dating, job and ride hailing markets, ad and
spectrum auctions, to innovative climate, electricity,
and financial markets. The development of these markets
not only creates new business opportunities to benefit
our social and economic lives but also improve our
scientific understanding of engineering incentives and
markets. There is probably no other field in econom-
ics and management science where researchers and
practitioners gain somuch by carefully listening to and
working with one another. In this spirit, perhaps the
most foundational change for generation of knowl-
edge is that researchers will increasingly have to use
the carpool lane in their own work, because riding
alone will soon be an inefficient choice in the knowl-
edge production game.
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Endnotes
1This section is an adjusted and updated, and much shortened,
version of the account of Ockenfels and Roth (2013) of the literature
on sniping in auctions for consumer goods. To simplify our expo-
sition, we will use the present tense when we talk about Amazon
auctions in this section, although Amazon shut down its auction
platform many years ago.
2This section is mostly based on Cramton (2013). Because of space
restrictions, we cannot discuss issues related to package bidding here,
although they are an important part of the auction design literature
(Cramton et al. 2006, Milgrom 2017), with important papers pub-
lished in Management Science, such as Pekec and Rothkopf (2003),
Kwasnica et al. (2005), and Goetzendorff et al. (2015). In this context,
some early papers also addressed strategic timing, such as Rassenti
et al. (1982) and Banks et al. (1989).
3Klemperer (2020) proposes an ending rule for spectrum auctions
that is somewhat closer to eBay’s hard close, namely a hybrid of the
ascending, soft-close auction format and the sealed-bid format, which
he calls Anglo-Dutch. The idea is that the early bidding is like in the
simultaneous ascending auction, but bidders can make final sealed
bids at the end of the auction. Klemperer argues that this kind of hard
close can discourage collusion in the dynamic phase of the auction,
because the last-minute round allows bidders to renege on any deals
without fear of retaliation, and, because the final bids induce some
uncertainty about the winner, this can also attract entrants. Such
concerns are not relevant for the choice of eBay’s hard close ending
rule in their single-object auctions, however.
4 Studies on eBay reveal that bidders do not bid truthfully early in the
auction but that much of the price discovery is done only in the
closing seconds of the auction (Ariely et al. 2005).
5Here, each lot corresponds to a specific quantity of spectrum,
measured in either MHzPop or in eligibility points. The bidder starts
with an initial eligibility based on the bidder’s initial deposit. To
maintain this level of eligibility in future rounds, the bidder needs to
bid on a sufficiently large quantity of spectrum in the current round,
where sufficiently large is stated as some percentage, typically between
80% and 100% of the bidder’s current eligibility. If the bidder bids
on a smaller quantity, the bidder’s eligibility is reduced in fu-
ture rounds.
6Ely and Hossain (2009) suggest from their field experiment that the
availability of closely substitutable auctions on eBay may reduce the
overall benefit of sniping.
7Another auction context where much has been learned from labo-
ratory human subject research is the practical design of procure-
ment auctions, with much research published in Management Science
Chen et al.: Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–32, © 2020 The Author(s) 25
(Katok and Roth 2004; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 2008; Davis
et al. 2011, 2014; Chaturvedi et al. 2014; Fugger et al. 2015).
8This section is based on, and partly taken from, the school choice
literature review in Chen et al. (2018) and Chen and Kesten (2019).
9This section is mostly based on, and partly taken from, Chen and
Kesten (2017, 2019).
10 In a set of innovative papers, Boudreau et al. (2011) examine naturally
occurring data to explore the effects of group sizes in tournaments on
software development. Their variable of interest is the score assigned
to a solution of a software problem rather than effort levels.
11Many scholars credit English poet John Milton(1608-1674) for this
quote—specifically “At a Vacation Exercise in the College” (1628)—
but the saying does not seem to appear in any of Milton’s writings.
Branch Rickey, a Major League Baseball Executive is also credited
with making this statement in 1915.
12Building on Gneezy and List (2006), Ockenfels et al. (2015b) and
Sliwka andWerner (2017) have explored the timing of wage increases
in more detail showing that performance can be raised when pro-
viding smaller but more frequent wage increases. As Sliwka and
Werner argue, these patterns (as well as the pattern detected by
Gneezy and List 2006) can be well organized in a simple dynamic
model of reciprocity, where workers reciprocate higher wages but
adapt their reference points over time. In turn, reciprocal reactions to
wage increases naturally wear off but can be made more persistent
when the wages are increased gradually.
13 Further evidence for the importance of loss aversion in the design of
compensations schemes in field settings is provided by Ockenfels
et al. (2015a), who study the bonus scheme of a multinational
company. The bonus scheme created a clear reference point as
managers in parts of the company learned not only the size of their
bonus but also the percentage share of their bonus relative to their
direct colleagues. Studying the association between these bonus
shares and job satisfaction, Ockenfels et al. (2015a) find a substantial
asymmetry around this 100% threshold, well in line with the patterns
predicted by loss aversion.
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Vertrauens. Becker J, Deutschmann C, eds. Kölner Zeitschrift für
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (Sonderhefte, Wiesbaden, Ger-
many), 219–242.
Greiner B, Ockenfels A, Sadrieh A (2012) Internet auctions. Peitz M,
Waldfogel J, eds. Oxford Handbook of the Digital Economy (Oxford
University Press, NY), 306–342.
Groves T (1973) Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41(4):617–631.
Gul F (1997) A Nobel prize for game theorists: The contributions of
Harsanyi, Nash and Selten. J. Econom. Perspective 11(3):159–174.
Gutt D, Neumann J, Zimmermann S, Kundisch D, Chen J (2019)
Design of review systems—A strategic instrument to shape
online reviewing behavior and economic outcomes. J. Strategic
Informs. Systems 28(2):104–117.
Hakimov R, Kübler D (2019) Experiments on matching markets: A
survey. WZB Discussion Paper.
Harbring C, Irlenbusch B (2003) An experimental study on tourna-
ment design. Labour Econom. 10(4):443–464.
Harbring C, Irlenbusch B (2008) How many winners are good to
have?: On tournaments with sabotage. J. Econom. Behaviors Or-
ganization 65(3-4):682–702.
Harbring C, Irlenbusch B (2011) Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence
from a laboratory experiment. Management Sci. 57(4):611–627.
Harsanyi JC (1967) Games with incomplete information played by
“Bayesian” players: Part I. Management Sci. 14(3):159–182.
Harsanyi JC (1968a) Games with incomplete information played by
“Bayesian” players: Part II. Management Sci. 14(3):320–334.
Harsanyi JC (1968b) Games with incomplete information played by
“Bayesian” players: Part III. Management Sci. 14(3):486–502.
Hassidim A, Romm A, Shorrer RI (2016) “Strategic” behavior in a
strategy-proof environment. Proc. 2016 ACM Conf. Econom. Comput,
Maastricht, Netherlands, July, 2016 (ACM, New York), 763–764.
Hastings JS, Weinstein JM (2008) Information, school choice, and
academic achievement: Evidence from two experiments. Quart. J.
Econom. 123(4):1373–1414.
He Y (2014) Gaming the Boston school choice mechanism in Beijing.
Working paper, Rice University, Houston, TX.
HedblomD,Hickman BR, List JA (2019) Toward an understanding of
corporate social responsibility: Theory and field experimental
evidence. Working paper, NBER, Cambridge, MA.
Heyman JE, Orhun Y, Ariely D (2004) Auction fever: The effect of
opponents and quasi-endowment on product valuations. J. In-
teractive Marketing 18(4):7–21.
Holmstrom B (1982) Moral hazard in teams. Bell J. Econom.
13(2):324–340.
Hossain T (2008) Learning by bidding. RAND J. Econom. 39(2):509–529.
Hossain T, List JA (2012) The behavioralist visits the factory: In-
creasing productivity using simple framing manipulations.
Management Sci. 58(12):2151–2167.
Houser D, Wooders J (2005) Hard and soft closes: A field experiment
on auction closing rules. Zwick R, Rapoport A, eds. Experimental
Business Research, Vol. II (Springer, New York), 123–131.
Hoxby C, Avery C (2013) The missing “one-offs”: The hidden supply
of high-achieving, low-income students. Brookings Papers Econom.
Activity 2013(1):1–65.
Hoxby C, Turner S (2015) What high-achieving low-income students
know about college. Amer. Econom. Rev. 105(5):514–517.
Imas A, Sadoff S, Samek A (2017) Do people anticipate loss aversion?
Management Sci. 63(5):1271–1284.
JiangM (2016)When do stable matchingmechanisms fail? The role of
standardized tests in college admissions. Working paper, Uni-
versity of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Jagannathan R (2019) On frequent batch auctions for stocks. Working
paper, NBER, Cambridge, MA.
Kagel JH, Roth AE (2000) The dynamics of reorganization in
matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a
natural experiment. Quart. J. Econom. 115(1):201–235.
Kahneman D, Lovallo D (1993) Timid choices and bold forecasts: A
cognitive perspective on risk taking. Management Sci. 39(1):17–31.
Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979) Prospect theory: An analysis of
decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2):263–291.
Kahneman D, Knetsch JL, Thaler RH (1990) Experimental tests of the
endowment effect and the Coase theorem. J. Political Econom.
98(6):1325–1348.
Chen et al.: Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–32, © 2020 The Author(s) 29
Katok E, Roth AE (2004) Auctions of homogeneous goods with in-
creasing returns: Experimental comparison of alternative “Dutch”
auctions. Management Sci. 50(8):1044–1063.
Kearns M, Roth A (2019) The Ethical Algorithm (Oxford University
Press, UK).
Kerschbamer R, Neururer D, Sutter M (2016) Insurance coverage of
customers induces dishonesty of sellers in markets for credence
goods. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 113(27):7454–7458.
Kerschbamer R, Neururer D, Sutter M (2019) Credence goods mar-
kets and the informational value of new media: A natural field
experiment. Working paper, MPI Collective Goods Discus-
sion Paper.
Kim K, Chung K, Lim N (2019) Third-party reviews and quality
provision. Management Sci. 65(6):2695–2716.
Kirchler M, Huber J, Stefan M, Sutter M (2016) Market design and
moral behavior. Management Sci. 62(9):2615–2625.
Klein TJ, Lambertz C, Stahl KO (2016) Market transparency, adverse
selection, andmoral hazard. J. Political Econom. 124(6):1677–1713.
Klemperer P (2004)Auctions: Theory and Practice (PrincetonUniversity
Press, NJ).
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